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Normative consensus-- o r  i ts absence-- has  l ong  been a  c e n t r a l  concern 
i n  sociology.  The p re sen t  paper exp lo re s  t h e  poas ib l e  meanings of con- 
s ensus  and t e s t s  t h e  deg ree  o f  c o g n i t i v e ~ c o n s e n s u s  on t h e  norm of j u s t  
d e s e r t s  ( i . e . ,  " l e t t i n g  t h e  punishment f i t  t h e  crlme").  I t  i s  argued, 
f i r s t ,  t h a t  consensus on complex norms of exchange. j u s t i c e .  and sanc t ion -  
i ng  should be t e s t e d  us lng  n  combination of wi thin-respondent  and h e t w e ~ n -  
respondent  techniqoes .  Such t e s t s  can (1)  s imul taneously  r e v e a l  tlie 
presence o f  consensus on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  involved and on the  s p e c l f i c  s o c i a l  
s t i m u l i  presented;  ( 2 )  f a c i l i t a t e  demographic compnrisons on adhe r ing  t o  
p r i n c i p l e  o r  ag ree ing  on f a c t s ;  and (3) r e v e a l  c o n f l i c t s  betveen Lhese two 
v e r s i o n s  of consensus .  For t e s t i n g  the  norm of J u s t  d e s e r t s ,  r a t i o  s c a l e  
measures of cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and punlshment s e v e r i t y  were employed, and a  
formula de r ived  from both  e q u i t y  theory and psychopliyslcs was u t i l i z e d  i n  
mode l - f i t t i ng .  Resu l t s  from a  sample survey ind i rn t ed  d rama t i ca l ly  s t r o n g  
use of t he  p r i n c i p l e  of j u s t  d e s e r t s  by memhers crf  t h e  pub l l r .  hu t  l e s s  
adherence t o  J u s t  d e s e r t s  by demogrnphically disadvantaged (low income o r  
h l a r k )  respondents .  A pa th  model crf t he  r e l a t i o n  hetween augrega te  and 
ind iv idua l  s c o r e s  demonstrated a fundamental t ens ion  between tlie two 
v e r s i o n s  of normative consensus ,  i n  t h a t  tlie more respdndents  uscd thP 
p r i n c i p l e  t he  more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  they dev ia t ed  from t h e  group averaue 
response.  The paper concludes  by d i s c t ~ s s i n g  t h e  imp l i ca t ions  of both  t h e  
s u h s t a n t l v e  f i n d i n g s  and t h e  new methodologics employed f o r  t he  understand- 
.. - 
i n g  of n o r m t i v e  consensus and t h e  assessment  of j u s t l c e  norms. 
ON MEASURING A NOREI: SH0IJI.I) TllE PUNISHMENT FIT TIIE CRIEIE? 
. . /  I r  , 
"Norm" is a  tl~rowawny word i n  modern sociology.  Norms tend t o  he 
invoked r a t h e r  than measured: t h e  s t a t emen t  t h a t  something is a  norm i s  
more o f t e n  the  conclus ion of an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  than i t s  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t .  
Neve r t l~c l e s s .  t h e r e  I s  gene ra l  agreement t h a t  a  norm is a  " ru l e ,  s t an -  
dard ,  o r  p a t t e r n  f o r  ac t lon"  (Williams. 1968, p. 204) .  The n o t i o n  t h a t  
such r u l e s  e x i s t  is pe rvas ive  i n  sociology: Yet t he  frequency wi th  which 
they a r e  invoked I s  not  matched hy c l a r i t y  of d e f l n i t i o n  wh i l e  doing so .  
Wit l~ln  t h e  gene ra l  d e f l n i t i o n  noted above, two nuances of meaning a r e  
t r , v i ca l ly  l e E t  undistinguished: norms a s  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r a l  e n t i t i e s  and 
a s  cogn i t i ve  s t r u c t u r e s .  A s  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r a l  e n t i t l e s ,  norms can  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  by p a t t e r n s  of behavior .  Nadel (1957) d i s t i n g u i s h e d  t h r e e  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  norms i n  t h i s  s ense :  s t a t i s t i c a l  frequency, mechanisms 
f o r  s anc t ion ing .  and cod i f i ca t ion . '  But t h e  r u l e s  t h a t  r e g u l a t e  behavior  
a r e  a l s o  presumably t o  he found i n  t h e  heads o f  t h e  people  who fo l low 
them. Individual  members of a  s o c i e t y  can  both  g i v e  s t a t emen t s  of what 
they s e e  norms t o  be and e v i d e n t l y  app ly  t h e i r  images of norms i n  t h e i r  
personal  e v a l u a t i o n s  of s p e c i f i c  ohservcd behaviors .  These i n d i v i d u a l  
adherences  r ep resen t  norm i n  i ts second sense:  a s  a  c o g n i t i v e  s t r u c -  
t u r e  i n  t h e  heads of t he  s o c i e t y ' s  p a r t i c i p a n t e .  Th i s  second n o t i o n  . 
of t h e  meaning of norm, a s  a  c o g n i t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  o r d e r i n g  one ' s  
For Ilorln:: a s  c o c n i t i v e  s t r u c t u r e s .  a  cen t r a l .  o111[:1ric;ll clucstlc-n i s  t l ~ c  
, : x l n t e ~ ~ c e  alld de;:rec nf consensus. 'Uhc s inIr lcs l  ve r s ion  of a  Corn i t i ve  
nursl i nvo lves  a11 I s o l a t e d  r u l e  a s soc ia t in t :  all a c t  wi . t l~  an  eva lua t ion  o r  
s anc t ion .  I s o l a t e d  s tn t e~nen t so f  t h e  rc1;1ti1~11 hctrrccr~ a c t  2nd cva lua t  ion 
call he t l ~ e  oLJccLn of ay.reement o r  d lsa j i reen~ent  by aicrsbers o f  s o c i e t y .  
A re;iJy tneasllre of consensus  nnlonj: men~hi:rs wm~ld. hc s i n ~ i  l a r i t y  'I,[ t l ~ e i r  
responses  o n  n  s ;~mple  survey!  l'lle 11otlo11 of c o t ~ s r n s t ~ r ;  is a ::ood dcn l  l e s s  
c l c ~ r  Tor co::nitlve ~ t r l r ~ c i p l e s  a t a  I~ ip . l~e r  l e v e l  of i tbs t rnct lor t ,  t l ~ o s e  
w l ~ i c l ~  s e r v e  t(i i ~ r ~ i t e  slid o r d e r  d i s p a i a t c  o b j e c t s  o r  moral rvalunLion.  111 
ger1er.11. 11nr1,1s governing e x c l ~ n ~ ~ g e ,  r r s o u r c e  nl  l o c a t i o n ,  and s a ~ ~ c t i o u l ~ ~ g  
i t s e l l - -  norms of j u s t i c e  and f a i r n e s s - -  a r e  R I I C I I  l ~ ig l i c r  l e v e l  : ib : ; t rac t i .o~~s.  
As no cxarnple. t h e  norm of r e c i p r o c i t y  ((;ouldner, l?lrO) i s  a  I ~ i c . \ ~ e r  l c v c l  
c o g ~ i i t i v c  p r i ~ ~ c i p l e  1rl1ic11 connec t s  d is1 ,nra te  a c t s  of  a l t r u i s m  i n  a  r e l a t i o ~ ~  
of m o ~ a l  c ~ ~ t . ~ i l r n e ~ ~ t  o r  o l , l i r .n t ion.  Cul~scrtsus on such nixnus is consldernlr ly  
more d l  f  f  i c u l  L t o  e v a l u a t e .  
!Illy i s  rnusensus  s o  complex f o r  rlorlns o l  j u s t i c c 7  A s  a  p r i n c i p l e ,  each 
e n t a i l s  t l ~ e  assessment  of a  category of Inltuts.  a ca tegory  O F  o r ~ t l , o t s ,  and 
t h e  r c l a t i o n  between them. For example, t h e  p r i n c i p l e  " e q t ~ a l  yny f o r  equa l  
work" i ~ l v o l v e s  e v a l ~ ~ a t i o n s  of work, pay and "equal." To be assessecl a s  a  
col:nLt l vc  s t r u c t u r e ,  s r ~ c h  a  norm sltotrld he  t e s t e d  f i r s t  a t  t h e  l e v c l  o f  tlle 
i r d i v i d u n l  respondent .  Such a  t e s t  would invo lve  assessments  by tlie respond- 
* e n t  of t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  of i n p u t s ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  va lue  of outcomes, and t h e  
al1:ropriaCe matc!~ between t h e  tw. Ilowever. i n d i v i d u a l  respondents  could  
:.11 ngreg n t  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  p r i n c i p l e ,  a l l  ma tc l~ jnp  what t hey  t ake  t o  b e  
e q u a l  i n p u t  wit11 o u t p u t ,  w h i l e  t o t a l l y  d i f i a c r e e i n g  alrlolre t h e m s e l v e s  on 
ally s p e c i f i c  i n s l a n c e  o f  t h e  work-pay r e l a t i o n .  Such d i s a g r e e m e n t  would 
f e l l c w  from l u c k  o f  Croup c o n s e n s u s  a h o u t  t h e  i l l p u t s ,  t h e  o u t p u t s ,  o r  t h e  
e x a c t  t r a ~ ~ s f o r m n t i o n  r u l e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a c h i e v e  e q u a l  matc l~ iny . .  Thus 
s o c i e t a l  c o n s e n s u s  a t  t l ~ e  l e v e l  o f  p r i n c i p l e  c a n  c o - e x i s t  w i t h  s o c i e t a l  
d i s s e n s u s  n t  t l ic l e v e l  o f  a p p l i c n t i o n .  ' I n .  swmnary, t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  
all c x t r c n ~ e l y  i m p n r t n ~ ~  t c n t . e ~ o r y  of  s o c i a l  norms, t h o s e  i n v o l v i n g  h i ~ h e r  
l e v e l  a l ~ s t r n c t i o n s  l i k e  j u s t l c e ,  e n t a i l s  R colnplex e v a l u a t i o n  of  t h e  p r e -  
uencc  of  cullscnscls and e v o k c s  p o t e n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  v e r s i o n s  o f  c o ~ ~ s e ~ l s ~ l s  
i t n c l f .  
'TIN: p r : l l  o f  clip p r r s c n t  s t u d y  i s  t h e  t e n t i n g  o f  consenstln 011 a  S i n g l e  
'- 
nurlil, t l l n t  t i [  t l ~ c  l ' n i r  s n l ~ c t l n n i ~ ~ g  o f  c r i m i n a l  a c t s .  I;nsed 0 1 1  t h e  p r i o r  
I I t c r i ~ t u r e .  uc: t :~l:r  t l le r u l r r c n t l y  d o r n l n n ~ ~ t  ideo1o~:y o f  f a i r  t ; a n c t l o n i n g  t o  
l o t .  L I IC .  ~ ~ l ~ i l o s n l ~ l i i ~ . n l  j r i ~ ~ c i p l c  o f  j u s t  d e s e r t s - -  more r u s l c n l l y  e x p r e s s e d  
lsy r:llI,c-rt : I I ~ I ~  S111l ivno ;IS tl1~2 ~ ~ o t i o r ,  t h a t  o n e  s l ~ o u l d  " l e t  t l i e  putlisllment 
f f ~  rltc c r l ~ a e . "  I<c i . r~ver ; t iy .n te  Lhe dep.ree o f  i n d l v i d ~ r a l  ad l le rence  t o  t h e  
j r r ~ 1 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ 1 c :  t l te O X L I ~ I I ~  t o  I : I I ~ C I I  i n c l i v i d ~ ~ n l  ; ~ J l i e r e n c e  i n  ~ c c o u i ~ ~ a ~ ~ i e ~  by a n g r c - .  
,:nt.c COII!;CIISII~; t r t t ~ c r ~ l  i ~ ~ d l v i d u ; ~ l . s ;  and t h e  e x t e n t  t o  wl l lc l~  i n d i v i d u a l  ad-  
I ~ r r c ~ ~ r r  i s  - e : : p l a i ~ ~ r d  - - - -- -- by :~,:l:r~?,:nte ~ O I I S I - I I S U R .  F i r s t .  Iiowcvcr. t h e  i n v e s t i -  
::;at loll is e ~ q ' l r i c a l l ? .  ::ro~ll~detl I n  p r i o r  s o c i n l  sc. ience 1 n v e s t i l : a t i o n ~  o f  
C I ~ : : I I  I C I I ~ I  u t l e .  !;ccnl~d, i t  1 s  t 1 1 c o r e t l c n . l l y  and mat11eln;it- 
Ic; i l ' ly ; ; r o ~ ~ ~ ~ d r ~ l  111  t h e  tllost r e l n v : i ~ ~ t  clevelopcd a p p r o a c h  t o  ~ c : r c c p t i o n s ' u f  
j u s t i c e ,  s o c i ; ~ l  pnycl~olop . icn l  c q u l t y  t l ieory  (cF. Uerkowftz S \ l n l s t e r ;  1976;  
U n l s t c r .  l!alfi tcr .  S I : e r s c l ~ e l d .  1.973). 
P r i o r  S t u d i e s  and C o d i l l c a t i o n  of  F i t t i n t :  t h e  r u ~ ~ i o l i m e ~ i t  t o  t h c  C r i ~ n c  .-- 
' I ' l l~  ~ l o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p u n l s l i m e ~ ~ t  n l ~ o u l d  f i t  t h e  c r j m c  h a s  s e r v e d  a s  t ho  
uneanmined baclrdrop f o r  t h e  most wide ly  s t u d i e d  i s s u e  ~ I I  conscnnlls on 
c r i m j n a l  j u s t i c e :  measurement of  t l ~ e ~ s c r l o u s n e a s  o f cr ime.  111 t h e  land-  
mark s t u d y  o f  S e l l  i t 1  and Wolfpmp, (1964).  s t ronj :  agreement  alnollp. J u d g e s ,  
p o l i c e  and s t u d e n t s  was ubocrved  o n  p s y c h o p h y s i c a l  a tensures  o f  c r l ~ a e  s c r i -  
o u s n e s s .  R o s s i ,  W a l t e ,  Ilosc, and nerk  (1974) ex tended t h e  e x a m i n n t l o n  o f  
c o n s e n s u s  t o  3 q110ta sample  o f  R n l t i m o r e ,  ~ ~ n i n p .  d l  t Curcnt  sca l lnkr  methods 
b u t  a r r l v i ~ i g  n t  q u i t e  s i n ~ l l n r  rcs111t.n. Numeroun o t h e r  s t u ~ l i e s  have  s h o r n  
s t ronp,  c v i i l e ~ ~ c e  hcrtl~ u1tl1i11 t h i s  c u l t u r e  rind c ~ o s s - c ~ ~ l t u r n l l y  of  a  r e l n -  
t i v c l y  i o v n r l s n t  or r le r l l~p ,  o f  c r i m e s  on r e l a t l v e  s e r i o u s n c ~ s .  
2 
Hut J 3  c r i m e  s e r i o ~ ~ s n e s n  i t s e l f  Lhcreby a  nor1117 I:ossi e t  n l .  (137'1. 
p. 237) c e r t a i n l y  t r e n t  i t  a s  s u c l ~ ,  r e f e r r i n g  i n  Cllclr  c o n c l ~ ~ s i o ~ i s  t o  
"norms d e r i u i n p .  hov' s e r i o u s  v a r i o u s  c r i m i n a l  a c t s  a r e  c o n s i ~ l c r e t l  t o  be. .  . ," 
"r,enernl n o r a n t l v e  t r e n d s , "  and " t l ~ e  normnt ive  s t r u c t u r e . "  Yet c r t m e  s c r i -  
o u s ~ ~ e s s  i o n l y  n o r m n t i v e  - e i t h e r  c o p . n i t i v e l y  o r  s o c i a l  f i t r l t c t u r n l l y  - i f  
i t  t h e n  I m p l f e s  s o l ~ ~ e t l ~ i n p ,  a h o u t  a c t i o n .  I~lllat Ross1 c t  01. i ~ s l i l l c l t  Ly 
i u c l u d e  i n  t h e  u n t e s t e d  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e  yunlsllmel~t sl1o111d T i t  t l l c  c r i m e .  
'l'l!c:y I I C I : ~  t h i s  1n11re e x p l i c i t  i n  111trndllci11p. t l i e l r  8LuJy. I J ~  sayl l i& t l ~ : ~ t  
s o c i e t n ~  cnlisenstls  " s ~ i o u l d  LC r e f ]  1:r tell 111 t l ~ e  r r i111inn1 COCIC, ~ I I C  ~ C I ~ ~ I V ~ U T  
crl j t~tlgefi  ~ I I I ~  j t ~ r i c s ,  3115 tllr a c t i n n s  of  law c n f o r i c * s ~ c ~ ~ t  njicnc {c:~" ( I> .  224)  -- 
i n  n t l ~ e r  ~ o r d s ,  t l ln t  judy.cn, ~ L C .  rcsl1oncl d i l f c r c n l l n l l y  t o  crj lncn n c c u r d i ~ l g  
t o  t h e i r  s e r i o u s ~ i e s s .  Ullless t11c.y wlsli t o  ary,uc LII;I  L more s c r  lolls  c r l a l e s  
a r e  [clt t o  d e s e r v e  l e n s  pu~iislanient,  Roost c t  n l .  must nlcnn v l ~ n t  ( : i l t ~ c r t  and 
S u l l i v a n  d j d  -- t h a t  !.lore t :c r ious  c r l r ~ c s  yliould h e  and n r c  resl'onclencl t o  
S e l l i n  and Wolfz.~nl: (lq1,fr) a l s o  I m p l i c i t l y  asstnned t h e  ~ ~ r i n c i p l c  of  
j u s t  d e s e r t s  i n  val1doLi11p t l ~ c i r  c r i m e  s e r i o u s n e s s  s c a l e .  I n  o n e  o f  t h e i r  
f o n r  modes of v a l i d r ~ L l n n ,  ' they r o r r e l o t e d  t h e  a v e r a g e  s e r i o u s ~ r e s s  o f  
c r i s e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t l r e i r  t . e s p o ~ ~ d e n t s "  i a t i n g s  w i t h ,  t i l e  inaxirnt~~r~ p u n l s l ~ m e n t  . 
then  a l lowed i n  t l ~ e  I ' c i u ~ s y l v a r ~ i a  p e n a l  code ,  a r r i v i n g  a t . . n  c o r r e l a t i o ~ ~  , o f  . , . . , 
.!I3 hr tween t h e i r  oggreg.lLe ser ion . ;ness  and  t h e  P e n n s y l v a n i a  nraximurn punish-  
mcnt. 1:y 't'rentin!; tlr'is n s  a  s c a l e  v n l i d a t l o n i  r a t h e r  ' than n s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
c r i s c  s c r i o ~ ~ s n e s s  was nrr'rcly a n  o l t e r ~ ~ n ' t i v e  measure  o f  punishment s e v e r i t y ,  
S e l l j n  ,111,l Wolfyanl: assnn,rd s o a r t l ~ j n g :  t h a t  c r i m e  s e r j o u s n e s s  was Lhe i n p u t ,  
pilnishment sevr-1 J'ty 't'lrc ' o u t p u t ,  and t h a t  t h e  norm was o n e  of  f  l t t j u p .  t h e  
p u n i s l h ~ ~ ~ c n t  t o  tlrc c r i l ~ l c .  3 
1'1 i s  'ildt ~ I P ~ ! ~ s ' s : J I ' ~ ~ ~  t l ln t  t h e  p h F i d ~ m c n t  sl'~diikd f ' i . ~  t h e  
* .  -. 
I i m p .  Amonp. k l ~ r  nlauy ctlrnpetiri;! ~ p i ~ r o a c l ~ e s  t o  why c r i m i u a l  I ~ c h a v i o r  slro111d 
b e  puni.;l~ed,  lac 11.1jor a P t c r ~ i n L i v e  view is t h e  r e l ~ a b i l i t a t i o n i s t  al lproach. 
l h i s  n p p r o a c l ~  ary,ues ' tha t  t h e  p u n i s h ~ n c n t  should  b e  fort . .ard-looking, f i t t i n r  
t h e  c r i m i n q l  r n t l ~ c r  t h a n  t h e  o f f e n s e ,  and pearecl t o  t h e  modif i c o t i o n  o f  t h e  
o f f e n d e r ' s  f n t ~ ~ r e  I ) c l ~ a v i o r .  l l r i s  ~ l ~ p r o a c l i  i r -  n o t  necessarily more l e n i e n t ,  
hc i t~p .  a. ;sociated wit11 s l l r l ~  p r a c t i c e s  a s  i n d e t e r m i n a n t  s e n t c n c i n y ,  h u t  i t  i s  
a n  a l t r n i n t i v e .  Conversc.ly, t l ~ r  p r i n c i p l e  thaL t h e  p u n i s l i r n e ~ ~ t  fi't t h e  
crinre sl lould noL hc  J r l c n t i f i r ~ l  s o l e l y  w i t h  t h e  n i b l l c a l  r e t r i h ~ ~ t i v i s t  "no 
e y e  f o r  an  cyc.. ." I n s t e a d .  s o a r  n o t i o n  o f  f i t  bc twern  s e r i o u s n e s s  of  n F f c ~ n s r  
and q e v e r j t y  of  p u n i s l ~ m e n t  c a n  b e  s e e n  n s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  d e t e r r e n c e  and 
i n c a p n c i t n t j o l ~  ,a~,~>roa;hes n s  w e l l  a s  a  r e t r i h u t i v b  a p p r o a c h  t o  p t ~ n i s l ~ m e n t  
(von Ilirscl1,1?77h). I n  p.enr rn l ,  i t  h a s  r e c e n t l y  b e e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p h i l o s o -  
p h i c a l ' n o t i o n  o f  j u s t  d e s e r t s ,  accord inp ,  t o  which punishment  s h o u l d  b e  e r a -  
d a t e d  a c c o r d i n g  ' to t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  o f f e n s e ,  is t h e  fundamenta l  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  E a t r n r s s  i n  punishment ( I lnr t ,  1968;  von I l i r s c h ,  1370) .  I t  
i s  incnrpol . lLed  i n t o  a l l  a p p r o n c l ~ e s  to  why i n d i v i d u a l s  s11v11ld b e  punished  
e x c e p t  f o r  ' r c l ~ a b i l i t ~ t i o ~ ~ ;  i t  is  a l s o  o b s e r v a b l e  i n  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  c o t i i f i -  
c a t i o n s  of s e n t e n c i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  ' I n ' s h o r t ,  d e s e r t  would a13year Lo h e  t h e  . . 
d o n ~ i n a n t  i d r o l o g y  o f  punishnient i n  Anglo-American law and s o c i e t y ,  and 
t h u s  i s  l l k e i y  t o  b e  t h e  domioant c o n s e n s ~ l a l l y  h e l d  v e r s i o ~ ~  o f  c r i m i n a l  
j u s t i c e  anlrrng members o r  t h e  p u h l i c .  
III t h e  co&!ni t ive  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  h e l d  by members of  t h e  p u h l i c ,  j u s t  
d e s e r t s  i s  s l n ~ p l y  t h e  G i l b e r t  and Sul  l i v n n  n n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p t ~ n i s l ~ m e n t  s l l o t ~ f d  
f i t  .the c r i m e ,  s o  f a r  assumed r a t h e r  t h a n  t e s t e d  i n  i n v e s t l ~ a t l o ~ ~ s  o f  s o c i a l  
c o n s e n s n s  r e g a r d i n g  c r i m i n n l  j u s t i c e .  Yestirag t l ~ e  n o r o  r f  j n s t  d e s e r t s  a s  
a  c o s n i t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  I n v o l v e s  m e a s u r i ~ ~ g  i n r l i v i d u ; ~ l  e v a l u n t  i n n s  of  c r ime 
scr tousnes . ;  a r ~ d  p u n i s l ~ m e n t  s e v e r i t y :  a l l o w l n g  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  a s s i g n  punish-  
rilenL t r ~  c r l ~ r . e s ;  and a s s e s s i n g  whether   he r e s n l t i n g  m?Lcli i s  c x p l a i ~ ~ a b l e  . 
i n  te rms  o f  a n  e q u i t a b l e  f i t  between t h e  s u b J e c t i v e l y  jndged i n p u t s  and o u t -  
comes. Consenqns on t h e  norm c a n  b e  measured a t  t h e  two l e v e l s  o f  p r i n c i p l e  
and  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  by a  c o m b i n a t i o n  of t e s t s  withi11 iudiv1d11 :l r e s p o n d e n t s  
and between r e s p o r ~ d e n t s .  
111 o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a  model f o r  j u s t  d e s e r t s ,  i t  is n e c e s s a r y  t o  e s t a h -  
l i s h  a  theoretical a l ~ d  m e t l ~ o d o l o g i c a l  framework. S o c i a l  p s y c l ~ o l o g i c a l  
e q u i t y  t h e o r y  p ~ v v j d e s  a  p o t e n t i a l  framework, a s  i t  is s e r n e r a 1  epprooclr  
t o  s o c i a l  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  J u s t i c e  w i t h i n  which some i n v e s t i g n t f o n s  o f  f a i r -  
n e s s  o f  s a n c t i o t ~ i n p ,  have  a l r e a d y  heen  c a r r i e d  o u t .  Examinat ion  o f  t h e  
e q u i t y  t h e o r )  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  i s s u e ,  however,  p r o v e s  t o  c a l l  f o r  
n ~ o d i f i c a t i o l l s  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  of  e q o i t y  t o  ' e r i m i n a l  
s a n c t i o n i n g  n e  w e l l  n s  f o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  measurement t e c h n i q u e s .  
I n  s h o r t ,  j ~ t s t  d e s e r t s  a s  a  prohlem r e v e a l s  problems i n  e q u i t y  t h e o r y  
i t s e l f .  
E q u i t y  T l ~ c o r y  ss o Framework f o r  J u s t  D e s e r t s  
D i s t r i b r ~ t i v e  j u s t i c e  is f u n d n m e n t a l l y  d e s c r i b a b l e  a s  a  l o g i c  o f  equiv-  
n 1 ~ 1 1 c e  o r  h a l a n c e  between i n d i v i d u a l s .  From A r i s t o t o l e ' s  ! ~ i c h o m c l ~ e a n  
E ~ l ~ l c s  t o  Aclams (1965) .  t h i s  I ~ a l n n c c  h a s  been  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a n  e q u a t i o n  i n  
w l ~ i c h  L l ~ e  i n p u t / o ~ ~ t p u t  r a t i o  o f  o n e  p a r t y  t o  a n  i n t e r a c t i o n  s h o u l d  e q u a l  
t h e  i n p ~ ~ t f o ~ ~ t p u t  r n L l o  o f  t h e  o t h e r .  E q u i t y  t h e o r y  d e r l v e s  f tom A r i s t o t l e  
111 I , n o i c n l l y  n L t c l ~ ~ p t l n f i  t o  e v n l u n l c  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  f a i r n r s s  o f  different 
Recent a t t e m p t s  Lo e x t e n d  e q u i t y  t h c o r y  t o  i n c j d c n t s  o f  l o s s  o r  harm-- 
n c g n t  i v e  i n p ~ ~ t s  by nne  par ty- -  I ~ n v e  o c c n s i o n c d  b o t h  ~ n a t h a m a t i c a l  and coocep- 
t11n1 c o n f ~ l s l o ~ ~ .  Tn t l ~ e  two-p:~rty r x c l ~ a ~ ~ ~ e .  s u c h  c o n c e r n s  have  n e c e s s i t a t e d  
mndifylnp. t l ~ r  n n t l ~ c s ~ : ~ t i c : ~ l  Lrra tmcnr  o f  r a i r ~ ~ c s s  beyond t h e  A r i s t o L c l i a n  
I n r ~ a ~ l n  ( c f .  idnlfi ler .  I l e r s c l l c l ~ l .  h l J a l s t e r ,  1973;  I l n r r i s ,  1376). t fn t l~crnnt lc -  
a l l y ,  t l ~ o  ~ I I I I ~ ~ I I I C I I L ~ ~  h l ~ l f t  113s I ~ c e n  t o  r e p l a c c  n  y r l n c i p l e  of  ~ l r o y o r t i o n -  
n l i t y  n s  t h e  c r n t r n l  n ~ o d e l  wit11 n  p r f ~ ~ c i l > l c  o f  munotonic  c o n s i s t e n c y  between 
i n p u t s  and o t ~ t p u t r r  f o r  e a c h  p n r t y .  C o n c e p t u a l l y .  t h e  c o n s i d e r n t j o n  o f  ne8a- 
t i v e  i n p ~ l t s  h a s  h c l p e d  t o  s p u r  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  e q u i t y  t h e o r y  i n t o  e v a l u a -  
1 ,  
t i o n s  of  f a i r n e s s  of  crchnnp.e hy t l ~ i r d  p a r t i e s ,  T l ~ c ,  law i t s e l f  can  h e  s e e n  . i . . 
a s  n c t l n y ,  n s  n  t h l r d  p a r t y  w l ~ i c h  e v a l u a t e n  t h e  f a i r n e s s  o f  exchnnges .  . . 
F u r t h c r ,  l n d i v l d ~ ~ n l .  ~ n c m t ~ e t s  o f  n o c l e t y  c a n  i n  t u r n  e v a l u a t e  l ~ o w  t h e y  f e e l  
t h e  law slrould t r c n  t  o f  f c l ~ d e r s .  The  o c  a s s e s s m e n t s  from i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z c n s  
-R- 
c a n  p o t c n ~ i a l l  y  t a p  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  v e r s i o n  o f  s a n c t i o n i n g  norms. 
I lovever,  r e c e n t  n t t e m p t s  t o  a p p l y  e q u i t y  t h e o r y  t o  l e g n l  s e t t i n g s .  
summarized Iry A u s t i n ,  W a l a t e r ,  and Utne (1976) and  W n l s t e r  e t  81. (1978).  
have  n o t  heen e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  and r e s u l t s  h a v e  n o t  heen  overwhelmingly 
s t r o n g .  Why i s  t h i s  t l ~ e  c a s e ?  The k e s e o r c h  i n  t h i s  a r e a  h a s  i n v o l v e d  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  p r e t r i a l  s u f f e r i n 8  o n  s u b s e q u e n t  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  and s e n t e n c i n g  
o f  t h e  d e f c n d n n t .  As i n  p r i o r  e q u i t y  r e s e a r c h ,  t h e  dominant c o n c e r n  l ~ n s  
been  how J n d i v j d u a l  c i t i l e n s  would r c c ~ i f y  i n e q u i t y  ~ l ~ e n  i t  o c c u r s .  For 
example,  Al l s t in ,  Wnlnter. rind Utne (1976) i n v e s t i g a t e d  t h e  e f f e c t s  on sub- 
s e q u e n t  q c n t e n c i n g  o f  a  criminal's ' s u f f e r l n ~  i n  L l ~ e  a r t , '  f n c t o r l n l l y  
rnanipulatJn);  t h i s  s u f f e r i n p ,  a s  bcinp, st o n e  o f  t h r e e  l e v e l s  ( i n s u f f J c L c n t ,  
n p p r o p r i n t e ,  o r  o v e r l y  fievere).  Across  two c r i n ~ c s - -  n  p u r s e - s n n t c h i n e  and 
n  n ~ ~ ~ ~ p , l r ~ g - - L l ~ e  a ~ ~ t h c v o  C o u ~ ~ d  t h a t  t h e  s u b s r q u e n t  s r n t e n c e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  cle- 
f e n d n n t  wns lower  i f  I I C  had h r e n  ~ ~ ~ h j e c t e d  t o  p r e l r i o l  f i u f f r r i n g  tlmL was 
t o o  s e v e r e .  
'I'l~e ~ n a J o r  p o t e 1 1 t f n 1  d e t e r m i n a n t  of s e n t e n c i n g ,  I~owevcr ,  hno gurle ~ ~ n i n -  
v e s t l ~ a t e d  111 t h c s e  s t u ~ l i e s .  L e g n l l y  and I ~ i s t o r l c a l l y ,  t h e  major  o v e r l d y  
o f  e q u i t y  upon c e n t c ~ ~ c i n ~ ,  would a p p e a r  t o  he  t h e  n n t i o n  t h a t  punisllmeht 
sI~c,uld n n t  h e  I ~ ~ o r c l i n s t e  o r  a r h i t r a r l  l y  I  inked  t o  a n  i tLfenne.  Even t h e  
Ilchrcw ~ [ ~ l . i o n l s .  "an e y e '  f o r  a n  e y e ,  a  t o o t h  f o r  n  t o o t l ~ . "  l n c o r p o r n t e s  
c l ~ t s  n c i t ~ o n  ( c f .  Rip.p.s, 1 9 5 5 ) .  !;cconcl$rll.y, n  f u r t l ~ e r  c o n c e r n  of  . l e c n l  s y s -  
tems Inns heen  c q ~ ~ i t y  nmonp. o f f e n d e r s .  A s  I la r t  (1968) pclL this collcrrl l ,  t h e  
f n l r  p u n i s l ~ m e ~ ~ t  sys tem i n c l u d e s  t h e  c o ~ ~ d i  t i o n  t l ~ o L  s i m i l a r l y  sf tuntccl  defen-  
d a n t s  be t r e a t e d  n i ~ ~ ~ i l a r l y  and d i f  f e r e ~ ~ t l y  s i t r ~ n t e d  alcfcn~lnnl !I t ~  e o t e d  
d J r E c r c l ~ t l y .  .111rics I ~ a v e  h l s t o r l c n l l y  responded h o t t ~  t o  L l ~ c  u n f n l r n e s s  o f  
an  a v a i l a b l e  punisl~~nenl: being too harsh f o r  t h e  o f t e n s e  (Simo11, 1967) and In  r a i s i n g  t h e  ques t ion  of o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  i n p u t s  and outcomes, j u s t  d e s e r t s  
P 
t o  t h e  un fa i rnes s  o r  one person r ece iv ing  Itarsher t rea tment  t l ~ n n  ano the r  l e a d s  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  measurement i s s u e :  how would-- o r  s l l ~ u l d - -  nne measure 
f o r  a  j o i u t  o r  cornnlo~ily con:nlitted o f f e n s e  (Kalven 6 Z e i s e l ,  1966). St ruc-  e q u i t y ?  
t u r a l l y ,  cr.iminnl J ~ l s t i c c  i s  s e t  up a s  a  balance between a c t  and punish- 
ment, wit11 t h e  s l n t r  a: L I I C  t h i r d  pa r ty  judge, r a t h e r  than a s  a  balance - 
between i ~ ~ d i v l r l u a l  o f f e n d e r s  and v i c t ims .  l h e  sys tem's  i n p u t s  a r e  c r imes  
and i t s  outcomes a r e  punisllments. Its h a l a ~ ~ c i n g  a c t  i s  thus  hetween 
oCfenders a c r o s s  i n p u t s  and outcomes. 
b 
I f  r l t i s  uanlcl of r l f n ~ i n a l  j u s t i c e  is appropr i a t e .  then t h e  nlnjor d e t e r -  
minant of s e n t e ~ ~ c i n g  s l ~ o r ~ l d  be  looked f o r  a c r o s s  offcnders--  nncl i t  should 
be Lhe o f f r ~ l s c  conm~itterl. For example, t h e  major f a c t  lentling t o  d i f f e r e n t  
... . 6enLcnci11g should be w l ~ e t l ~ e r  one was a  pu r se - sna t c l~c r  o r  a  mugger, uot  . , ,  
' " . .  , , * ' .  . . . ' . -  - ...:. . :-. . . ). ' .  , - .  ,,.' . , ' . , .  . - 1. . a ~eag" ; ing  i q u i ' g  ' -- 
,. . .. .... I L . .  . _ ,  i .... 
An equ i ty  p r i n c i p l e  is srme formula f o r ' t i a t c h t ~ r ~  i n h t s  t o  btttcndek in  a '  
way which is perceived a s  f a i r .  I n  most o f  t h e  now-virlvminous e q u i t y  l i t e r n t u r e ,  
t h i s  m.1tr11lng Is expressed a s  an e q ~ l a t l o t ~ .  Particularly s i n c e  t h e  advent of 
concern over  handl ing nega t lve  i n p u t s ,  t h e r e  hns been considerable debate  over  
t h e  c o r r e c t  form f o r  S I I C ~  equa t ions .  Ifowever. t h i s  d c b . ~ t e  has  been Largely 
t h e o r e t i c a l ,  a s  a c t u a l  r e sea rch  gene ra l ly  assumes t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  t o  hold 
nnd t e s t s  t he  impart of va r ious  d e v i a t i o n s  from an e q u i t a b l e  arraojiement on 
t h e  reacLLons of exper imental  s u b j e c t s .  Recent c r i t i q ~ ~ e s  ( c f .  Adnms and Freedman, 
r : t l ~ e r  one s t ~ f f e ~  ed i n  t h e  a c t  o f  e l  t l ~ e r  purse-snntchinp. o r  m~~p,gtng. I.xten- 
1976;  t l n r r i s ,  1976) have suggested t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e l a b o r a t e  e q u i t y  
. s i o n  o f  equ i ty  concerns  t o  i nc lnde  evn lua t ions  by i n s t i t ~ ~ t i o n a l  t h i r d  l l a r t l e s  
l i k e  t l ~ c  law net-ds Lo hc accompanied by ex tens ion  of t h e  no t ion  of what i s  
I>ejng con~pnred o r  h.llanccd. The primary l e g a l  balance may be cons ide rab ly  
a b s t r a c t e d  fronl tllr s p e c i f i c s  of t h e  c r j ~ n e  i t s e l f ,  and may invo lvc  o t h e r  
p a r t i e s  ( 1  . e . .  o t h e r  offrntler s )  who form an  i n ~ p l l c i t  cnml~ar ison rrorlp f o r  
any s i n g l e  ca sc .  
With c e r t a l n  mod i f i ca t ions ,  however. t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of j u s t  d e s e r t s  
II: c r imina l  s a ~ ~ c t j o n i n g  can he  ur~ders tood a s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s c  of t h e  g e ~ ~ e r a l  
p r i n c i p l e  of equ l ty .  I t  c e r t a i n l y  invo lves  i n p u t s ,  outcomes, and t h e  match- 
f o r m ~ ~ l a e  ppear  t o  c a l l  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  forms of r e sea rch  des ign  and lo r  l e v e l s  of 
meaqurement from those  p rev ious ly  employed-- i n  s h o r t ,  t h a t  e q u t t y  a s  a  p r in -  
c i p l e  o r  formula dese rves  t o  be t e s t e d .  
M ~ a t  would i t  look l i k e  t o  t e s t  an e q u i t y  formula?  Examinnt~on o f  t h e  
e x i n t l n g  Literature s u g g e s t s  t h a t  two i s s u e s  have been hidden by t h e  p r i o r  
i n t e r e s t s  of r e s e a r c h e r s  and t h e  p r i o r  s t r a t e g i e s  of r e sea rch .  F i r s t .  is 
e q u l t y  genuinely  used by i n d i v i d u a l  respondents  t o  o r d e r  t h e i r  pe rcep t ions  o f  
t h e  world? Second, do i n d i v i d u a l s  consensua l ly  a g r e e  on what is an equitable 
outcome given a  s p e c i f i c  i npu t?  These a r e  of c o u r s e  s p e c i f i c  forms of t h e  
in:. of t he  two , t o  ach jeve  s t~pposed f a i r n e s s . .  It simply, e x t r n d s  and makes 
'general iss;es suggested'car1ier.a~-being-central t o  t h e  t e s t i n g  of any norm 
e x p l i c i t  what i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  a l l  two-party assessments  of equ i ty :  t h e  eva l -  
a s  a  c o g n i t i v e  s t r u c t u r e .  
ua t ion  of a c t u a l  i n p u t s  and outcomes r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  ones .  
The t y p i c a l  e q u i t y  r e sea rch  des ign  is a  E a c t o r l a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  va r i ance  
i n  which exper imental  s u b j e c t s  each r e c e i v e  one expe r imen ta l  t rea tment .  Thus i n  
t h e  A ~ t s t l n  e t  n l .  (1976) s t u d y .  s u b j e c t s  r e n d  a b o u t  a n  o f f e n d e r  who r e c e i v e d  
o n e  o f  t h r e e  l e v e l s  o f  i n j u r y  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  a  c r i m e .  I n  s u c h  s t u d i e s  t h e  
e v a l u n t i o n  o f  t h e  I I I ~ I I ~ S  a s  hIgh/medium/low i s  t y p i c a l l y  a r r i v e d  a t  e i t h e r  by 
p r e t e s t i n g  t o  o b t a i n  c o n n e n s u n l l y  a g r e e d  upon s t i m u l i  o r  by r e c o u r s e  t o  common 
s e n s e .  The e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  is t h e n  u s e d  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  e x p e r j m e n t a l  ou t rome,  
whlch I s  c o ~ r n t e d  a s  c o n f i r m e d  by  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  be- 
tween a v e r a g e  outcomes  a s s i g n e d  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  e x p e r i m e n t a l  c o n d i t l o n s .  Con- 
v e r s e l y ,  t h e  ou tcomes  c a n  he  s p e c l f i e d  and  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  t h e  i n p u t s  n h t a i n e d .  
T h l r d l y ,  b o t h  ou tcomes  and  i n p u t s  c a n  be  d e s c r i b e d  and  s u h j e c t s  a s k e d  w h e t h e r  
t lrc a r r a n g e m e n t  I s  f a l r .  SI IC~I  d e s i g n s  a l l  s h a r e  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s :  f l r s t ,  t h e y  
i m p l i c i t l y  o r  e x p l l r i t l y  f i x  two components  o f  t h e  f o r m r ~ l a  and  t e s t  t h e  t h i r d ;  
s e c o n d ,  t h e v  rmploy e s s e n t i a l l y  o r d i n a l  I e v e l  c o m p a r i s o n s  between l e v e l s  o f  
t r e a t m e n t  c o n d . i t i o n s :  L h i r ~ l ,  t h e y  e i t h e r  assume o r  establish a  prJorI  c o n s e n s u s  
. o n  s t l m ~ ~ l i .  None el t l ~ r n e  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  t e s t i n g  o f  
c q r ~ l t y  n s  n  t h e o r y .  I n  f a c t ,  a l l .  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s  must be  a l t e r e d  
f o r  t l l c  f 1 1 l l - h l 1 1 ~ 1 1  t c s t i ~ i g  o f  e q u l t y .  
'TIII. t y l ~ l c a l  r e s e a r c l ~  c l e s l ~ n  c a n  be  c e n l r a s t e d  w i t h  o n e  wlrich a c t r ~ a l l y  
t e s t s  wl~eLher  e q ~ ~ i L y  h o l d s  a t  L I I C  l e v e l  o f  t h e  l n d i v i d u n l  r e s p o n d e n t .  T h i s  
a l  t c r r r n t i v e  d c s i g ~ r  lms  bcen  a  l l u d e d  t ~ )  h r l e f l y  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s t o n s  o f  n o r m a t i v e  
cor l sens l f s  and  j u s t  d e s e r t s ;  now i t  c a n  b e  f l e s h e d  o u t  i n  t e r m s  o f  i ts  c o r l t r a s t  
' 
t o  p r i o r  c q u i t  y '  r e s e a r c h .  Tlre r e q u l n i t r  I n g r e d i e n t s  . a r e  t h e  i n ~ i i v i d u a l s '  
. . 
malchen  o f  o h j c c t i v e  i n p t ~ t s  t o  ou tcomes ;  t h e i r  s u b j e c t l v e  a s s e s s m e n t s  o f  t h e s e  . . . 
l n p t ~ t s  nnd ott tcomcs: and a  t l l e o r e t i c ; r l l  y  p l a u s i b l e  e q u i  t y  model w i t h  which  . 
t o  a s s e s s  t h e  m n t c l ~ l n g .  For  example ,  t h e  l o g i c a l  f i r s t  s t e p  l n  t e s t i n g  t h e  
d i s t r l h u t  i v e  J u s t i c e  ,norm " e q ~ ~ a l  pny f o r  e q u a l  work" would he  t o  g e t  t h e  
r e s p o n d e n t  to s a y  which  work i o p ~ r c s  s h o u l d  g o  w i t h  w11Srh pay o ~ ~ t r o m r s . ~  T t ~ i n  
i s  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ' s  own v c r s i o n  o f  j u s t i r e .  But e a c h  o b J e c t i v e  s t l m u l u s  h a s  
a  p o t e n t i a l l y  u n i q u e  n u h j e c t i v e  meaning  t o  t h e  r e n p o n d e n t .  I f  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  
i s  a n s w e r i n g  equitably a c c o r d i n g  t o  theory- -  i f  e q u i t y  i n d e e d  l i e s  i n  t h e  e y e  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  beholder - -  he  o r  s h e  s h o u l d  be  match ing  o b j e c t i v e  I n p u t s  t o  
ou tcomes  c o ~ l s i s t e n t l y  w i t h  t h e i r  s r ~ h j e c t i v e  meaning.  Thus i f  o n e  c a n  o h t a l n  
t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ' s  own s u h J e c t i v e  a s s e s s m e n t s  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n p u t s  r e l a t i v e  
t o  o t h e r  i n p u t s  and t h e  v a l u r  o f  ou tcomes  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  ou tcomes .  o n e  c a n  
t e s t  whetlrer  t h e  r e s p c ~ n d e n t ' s  m a t c h i n g  is i n t e r n a l l y  equitable by s ~ ~ b s t i t u t i n g  
t l ~ e  s r l h j e r t . i v e  r a t i n g s  f o r  t h e  o b J e c t i v e  s t i m t ~ l i .  I n  s ~ r c l ~  a  d e n l g n .  e a c h  
respondenL e f f e c t i v e l y  s c r v e n  n s  a n  e x p e r i m e n t  i n  m o d e l - f i t t i n g .  Thr  e q r f i t y  
m d e l  l i e s  i n  t h e  e y e  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c l ~ e r  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  b e h o l d e r ;  r e s e a r c l ~ e r n  
r a n  t l ~ c r e f o r e  s n y  w l ~ r t h e r  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ' s  v e r s i o n  o f  " e q u a l  pay f o r  erlunl, work" 
f l t s  t i l e  t l ~ e c ~ r e t l c a l l y  p r e d i c t e d  v e r s i o n .  b u t  c a n n o t  s a y  what o t h e r  p r i n c l p l e n .  
IF any .  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  i s  h r i n p i n g  t o  h e a r  on t h e  t a s k .  
I n  t e s t i n g  w h e t h e r  t h c  punishment  s h o ~ ~ l d  TJ t t h e  crlmrl, a n  n n ; ~ l n g o ~ ~ s  mnclel- 
F i L t i n g  o p e r a t  ion  c a n  he, u s e d .  F i ~ l d l n g  n u t  w l ~ i r h  c*bJet ' t lve c r l n w s  a r c  ass lp .ned  
whi~:h o h j c c t i v e  p ~ ~ n i s l r m e n t s  d o e s  n o t  t e s t  e q ~ ~ i t y  n t  t h e  I n d l v i d ~ ~ n l  l e v e l .  011c 
n e e d s  t o  know I~ow s e r i o u s  l h e  r e s p o n d e n t  c r ~ n s l d e r s  t h e  c r l m e  and how s e v e r e  
t h e  p r ~ n l s h m e n t .  Then t h e  r e ~ p o l ~ d e n t ' s  m a t c l ~ e s  of  a  s e r l e s  o f  c r i m p s  and  
p ~ r n i v l ~ m e n t s  r a n  h e ,  t e s t e d  a g a i n s t  a  model which p r e d i c t 9  t l ~ e i r  m a t c h e s  l rom t h e i r  
s u h j e c t i v e  r a t i n g s  o f  s e r i o u s n e s s  and s e v e r i t y .  .111st a s  "equnl pay f o r  cq11n1 
work" is s h o r t h a n d  f o r  " t h e  v a l u e  o f  outcomefi s h v u l d  match t h e  v a l u e  o f  
i ~ i p u t s . "  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  punishment s l ~ o t ~ l d  [ i t  t h e  c r i m e  I s  s h o r t h n n d  f o r  
c o n s i s t e n c y  between t h e  s e r i o t ~ n n e s s  o f  a  c r i m e  and  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  p ~ ~ n i s h -  
ment i t  r e c c l v e n .  
Such a  m o d e l - f i t t i n g  d e s j g n  a l s o  a l l o w s  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  t o  test c o n s e n s u s  s e n s a t i o n  I s  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  e q u a t i o n  
r a t h e r  t h a n  s e t t i n g  i t  a  p r l . o r i ,  and t o  t e s t  two d 1 . s t i n c t  v e r s i o n s  o f  c o n s e n s u s .  
Consensus on t l ~ c  j u s t i c e  p r i ~ ~ c i p l e  i n v o l v e d  is r e p r e s e n t e d  by h i g h  l e v e l  o f  
n  
v = c x  ( 1 )  
( S t e v e n s ,  1 9 7 5 ) .  S t e v e n s '  Law, a s  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s l ~ i p  is known. In  t h e  psycho- 
i n d i v i d l ~ a l  f i t t i n g  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i e d  model.  Consensus  o n  s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  . . * . .physics l i t e r a t u r e ,  t r a n s l a t e s  i n t o  a  r a t h e r  s i m p l e  v e r b a l  c o n c e p t i o n :  t h a t  
s t l m u l l  I s  r e p r e s e n t e d  Ity ;I Illgh l e v e l  o f  b e t w e e n - i n d i v i d u a l  agreement . ,  Fo ten-  . - .. e q u a l  st imu111s .ratios. p r o d u c e  c q i ~ n l  t s ~ ~ b . j c c t i v e  r a t i o s .  . T l ~ u s  t h e  . p r r c e l v e d  
L l a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e s e  two forms  o f  c o n s e n s ~ ~ s  c a n  a l s o  be  a s s e s s e d ,  i n t e n s i t y  o f  many p l ~ y s i c a l  a t t r i b u t e s  r a n  h e  r a t i o  s c a l e d .  R e c e n t l y ,  psycho- 
a s  c a n  demogr ,~phic  b a s e s  o f  d l sap . reement .  A w i t h i n - r e s p o n d e n t  d e s i g n  makes i t  
p o s s l b l e  t o  p u l l  a p a r t  n o ~ m n t i v e  consensr t s  i n t o  i t s  component p a r t s .  
The p r e s e n t  s t ~ ~ d y  u s e s  t h i s  p ropnsed  a l t e r n a t i v e ' d e ~ l ~ n  f o r  t e s t i n g  t h e  
norm o f  f l t t l n p .  t h e  p ~ m l s h m c n t  t o  t h e  c r lme.  The s t u d y  d e v i a t e s  from p r i o r  
eq111ty r e s c a r c l ~  h n t h  s t ~ h e t . ? n t l v e l y  and  m c t h ~ r d o l o g l r a l  Ly. S ~ ~ b s t a n t i v e l y .  
we a r g u e  t h a t  t l ie  c r !n t r :~ l  principle t o  b e  a s s e s s e d  In t l i e  a r e n a  of . . c r , in~ina l  . . -. .. 
~ I I - t i c e  I s  jus t .  d e r e r t s ,  t h e  n o t l o n  t h a t  t h e  punishment  s11ot~l.d f i t  t h e  c r i m e .  
Methodologically, we a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  a p p r o p r l a t e  t e s t  o f  e q u i t y  ( a s  o f  any  
c o g n l t l v e l y  h e l d  norm of j r ~ s t . i c e )  i n v o l v e s  a n  i n t e r p l a y  betw,een i ~ ~ d l v i d u a l  
a d l ~ e r e n c o  t o  p r l n c  l  p l e  and i n d i v i d u a  1  s '  agreement  on  f a c t s .  The a s s e s s m e n t  
OF consensals on scrcl~ norms c a l l s  f o r  c o n s i d e r a L i o n  o f  b o t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  and 
p h y s i c a l  s e a l  l n g  t e c h n i q u e s  I ~ a v e  heen  e x t e ~ r d e d  i n t o  m e a s t ~ r c m c ~ i t  o f  t l j e  i ~ ~ t e ~ ~ s l t y  
dimension o f - s o c i a l  and p o l l t i c a l  a t t l t ~ ~ d e s  and n t t r i h u t r s - -  S I I C I I  ha o c c ~ ~ p a t i n n n l  
p r e s t i g e ' ( K ~ ~ n n a p a s  and Wilks t rom,  1 9 6 J ) ,  s o c l a l  s t a t u s  (Hamhlln.  1971:  R a l n w a t c r ,  
I 
1 9 7 1 ) .  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  p o l l t i c a l  o f f i c e s  ( S h i n n .  1 9 6 9 ) .  s u p p o r t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
i 
I . .  
i i n s t i t u t i o n s  (L.odge, e t  a l . ,  1976) .  a n d ,  o f  c o l l r s e .  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  c r i m e s  
! ( S e l l . i n  and Wol fgnng ,  1 9 6 4 ) .  6  
! 
1 P s y c h o p h y s i c a l  s c n l l n a  of s o c i a l  v a r i a b l e s  o f f e r s  a  h i g h l y  d e v e l o p e d  
I m e t l ~ o d o l o g y  backed by r i g o r o i l s  t l l e n r e t l . c a 1  p r e d i c : t i o n s  concern lnp .  p l i y s i c a l  
i 
i m o d a l l t l e s .  I t  h a s  two major  a d v a n t a g e s  o v e r  c a t e g o r y  and  J N D  ( J u s t - N o t l c c n h l e -  
I 
I D i f f e r r n c e )  s c a l e s  s u c h  a s  1 , lker t  and  T h u r s t o n e  s c a l e s :  i t  p l a c e s  fewer  con- 
I 
I s t r a l n t s  on  r e s p o n d e n t s .  and  i t  p r o v j d e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r o c e d ~ ~ r e s  For v a l i d a t i o n  
Methods 
S c a l i n g  ~e&niques :  P r o v i d i n g  R a a e v e l  Judgments  o f  Crime a n d  Punishment  - 
Homan.judgments o f  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  many p h y s i c a l  stimuli c a n  b e  shown 
I t s  a p p l l c a t l o n .  Given  t h e  appropriate v l t l i l n - r e s p o n d e n t  d e s i g n ,  h o t h  I u s l n g  t l i r  t e r h n l q u e  o f  c r o s s - m d a l i t y  mat:cl~ing ( s e e  f o o t n n t e  6 '  and  C l i f f ,  1 9 7 3 ) .  I 
t o  f i t  a  power f u n c t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween  s t i m u l a t i o n  and 
c o g n i t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  f a i r n e s s  and s o c i a l  c o n s e n s u s  on  fa lcnes! ,  c a n  b e  a s s e s s e d  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  
In  a d d i t i o n .  two m o d a l i t i e s  used  e s t e n s l v e l y  I n  p s y c h n p h y n i c s . p r o v e  t o  b e  
a d a p t a b l e  t o  s u r v e y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  M a ~ n i t u d e  e s t i m a t i o n  (I=),  s i m p l e  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  i n t e n s i t y  by a s s i a n i n g  ntrmbers, and  l i n e  p r o d u c t i o n  (LP); a s s e s s m e n t  o f  
g i n t e n s i t y  by d r a w i n g  l i n e s  o f  v a r i o u s  l e n g t l ~ s .  h a v e  c o n v e n i e n t  m a t h e m a t i c a l  
p r o p e r t i e s  ( c f .  Hami l ton  and  R o t k l n .  1978) .  I n  a d d i t i o n .  i t  1s q u i t e  F e a s i h l e  
t o  g e t  s u r v e y  r e s p o n d e n t s  t o  g i v e  number e s t i m a t e s  f o r  how many times more 
i n t e n s e  o n e  s o c i a l  s t i m u l ~ ~ s  i r e l a t i v e  t o  a n o t h e r ;  i n d e e d .  ME was t h e  method 
used by S e l l i n  and Wolfgang (1964). I t  is somewhat more cumbersome, but  
a l s o  p r a c t i c a b l e ,  t o  g e t  respondents  t o  draw l i n e s  o f  v a r i o u s  l e n g t h s  t o  
exp res s  t h e i r  a s se s smen t s  of r e l a t i v e  i n t e n s i t y .  (Other p o s s i b l e  m o d a l i t i e s  
such a s  a d J u s t i n g  t h e  b r i g h t n e s s  of l i g h t s  o r  squeezes  of a  hand would r e q u i r e  ! 
equipment such a s  a  r h e o s t n t  dev ice  o r  a  hand dynaroometer which a r e  h a r d l y  
i n  t h e  t y p i c a l  I n t e r v i e w e r ' s  expe r i ence  and which might t u r n  t h e  i n t e r v i e w e r  i n t o  
a  somewhat formidable  p o r t a b l e  l abo ra to ry  t echn ic i an .  ) Thus t h e  most. mathe- 
ma t l ca l ly  convenient  modal i t ies '  a r e  al.so t h e  most p h y s i c a l l y  convenient  ones ,  
and render  t h e  survey ins t rument  a  p o t e n t i a l  p l a c e  t o  a t t empt  p s y c h o p h y s i c ~ l  
s c a l i n g  .of s o c i a l  s t i m u l i .  
The p re sen t  i n v e s t i ~ a t i o n  u s e s  a  d a t a  s e t  o f  p syc l~ophys i ca l ly  de r ived  
s c a l e s  produced f o r  ano the r  p~trpose .  In a  r e sea rch  program on p r ~ b l i r  op in ion  
and c a p i t a l  punlshment,  p sychop l~ys i ca l ly  v a l i d a t e d  s c a l e s  f o r  s e r i o u s n e s s  of 
crime and s e v e r i t y  of punishment were developed ( see  Hamilton and Rotkin ,  1976, 
1978). In t h e  d a t a  s e t  used h e r e ,  respondents  were a d d i t i o n a l l y  asked t o  
I n d i c a t e  what p ~ ~ n i s h m e n t s  they wo111d a s s i g n  t o  t h e  c r imes  heing s c a l e d .  Given 
t h e  purrone of t h e  renc.arc11 program, t h e  s c a l e n  and t h e  d a t a  de r ived  from them 
a r e  not op t lma l  f o r  p re sen t  purposes .  The e s s e n t i a l  problems a r e  a  r r ime s e t  
and pttnlshment s e t  which emphasize p o t e n t i a l l y  c a p i t a l  o f f e n s e s  and r e l a t i v e l v  
seve re  punishments.  providing s c a l e s  w i th  a t t e n u a t e d  range.  Happily, from t h e  
po in t  of view of s c i e n t i f i c  i n fe rence .  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t l e n  make t h e  d a t a  s e t  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  s t r i n g e n t  t e s t  of c u r r e n t  con re rns .  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  found h e r e  both  
a t  t he  Individual l eve l  and a t  t h e  l e v e l  of agg rega te  consensus  a r e  l i k e l y  
t o  be low e s t l m a t e s  o f  a r t ~ ~ n l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
A c o t ~ p l e  of f e n t t ~ r e s  unique t o  psychnphysical  d a t a  make t h e  v a r l a b l e s  some- 
what unt~st ta l .  F i r s t ,  t l ~ e  d a t a  n r r  t l1ccrret4cally log-normal,  s i n c e  e r r o r s  i n  
r a t i o  judgments a r e  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  e r r o r s .  Secondly, respondents  ace  allowed 
t o  p i ck  an a r b i t r a r y  s t anda rd  o r  "modulus" a g a i n s t  which t o  a s s e s s  r e l a t i v e  
s e r i o u s n e s s  and s e v e r i t y . 7  In  keeplng wi th  t y p i c a l  hand l ing  of such d a t a  In  
psychophysics,  t h e  measures used i n  t h e  ana lyses  a r e  no t  raw s c o r e s .  I n s t e a d ,  
t hey  a r e  averages  of t h e  ME and LP judgments f o r  a  g iven cr ime o r  punishment. 
These a r e  logged and t h e i r  mean i e  s u b s t r a c t e d  ( equ iva l en t  t o  d i v i d i n g  t h e  raw 
s c o r e s  by geometr ic  means) t o  remove t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  s u b j e r t ' n  modulun. In  
psyrhophyslcs ,  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  s c o r e s  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  not  employed a t  a l l ;  group 
ave rages  a r e  used i n s t e a d .  Here, i n  o r d e r  t o  t e s t  j u s t  d e s e r t s  a s  a  c o g n i t i v e  
principle, t h e  s c o r e s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  respondents  a r e  employed. 
The Data S e t :  The Boston Survey Sample and In t e rv i ew Instrument.. 
I n  February and March, 1976, a  quota  sample of 391 respondcnts . f rom t h e  
Boston SMSA was ob ta ined .  There was no p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  i n  generall.zJ.ng 
t h e  r e s u l t s  t o  [bs ton pe r  s e ,  but  merely In  o h t a i n l n g  responses  from a d u l t s  
w i th  a  v a r i e t y  of demographic characteristics. In a d d i t i o n ,  p r i o r  r e sea rch  
by S e l l i n  and Wolfgang (1964) u s ing  d i f f e r i n g  purposive  samples, by Ross1 
e t  a1 .  (1974) u s ing  a  quota  sample of Baltimore; and by o t h e r  investigators 
r e p l i c a t i n g  t h e  Sellln-Wolfgang s c a l e  i n  a  nilinher of d i f f e r e n t  l o c a t i o n s  and 
c u l t u r a l  groups, had nllown cr ime s e r l o t ~ s n e s s  t o  be a  remnrk.lbly consensual 
and s t a b l e  judgment. Thus i t  was f e l t  j u s t i f i a b l e  t o  use  quota  sampling ra t l ter  
than s t r i c t  p r o b a b i l i t y  sampling t o  ga in  t h e  significant hudget s av ings  p o s s i b l e  
w i th  t h e  former. A l l  sampling and interviewing were done by t h e  Survey Research 
Program, Un ive r s i ty  o f  Massachusetts.  Roston. ' 
The da t a - se t  cons i s t ed  of a  face- to-face  in t e rv i ew of approximately  45 
minutes  du ra t ion  and a  dropoff  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w i th  an n d d i t l o n n l  approximately  45 
m i n u t e s  o f  m a t e r i a l .  I n  e a c h  p a r t ,  roughly  h a l f  o f  t h e  s u r v e y  m a t e r i a l  c o n s i s t e d  
o f  p s y c h o p l ~ y s i c a l  s c a l i n g  judgments ;  t h e  remainder  of  e a c h  p a r t  c o n t a i n e d  
a t t i t u d e  iLems r e l a t e d  t o  c r i m e s  i n v o l v i n g  a u t h o r i t y  ( e . g . ,  My L a i ,  W a t e r g a t e )  
i r r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  Respondents  were  p a i d  $5 .00  f o r  mai l -  
i n g  back t h e  d r o p o f f  que' . t ionnalre.  I n  a l l ,  314 (81%) d i d  s o ,  most v i t h o u t  - 
even a  follow-up t e l e p h o n e  c a l l .  M a t e r i a l  from t h e  d r o p o f f  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  forms 
t h e  d a t a  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  a n a l y s e s .  
In  t h e  i n t e r v i e w ,  r e s p o n d e n t s  f i r s t  comple ted  a  t r a i n i n g  t a s k :  w t c h i n g  
s u b j e c t i v e  magni tudes  of  l i n e s  t o  s t l m u l r ~ s  numbers and numbers t o  s t i m u l u s  
l i n e s .  T h i s  t a s k  s e r v e d  b o t h  t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  r e s p o n d e n t s  w i t h  p s y c h o p h y s i c a l  
judgments and t o  p r o v i d e  d a t a  f o r  t e c h n i c a l  c ~ r r e c t i o n s . ~  Respondents  t h e n  
r a t e d  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  of  t h e  1 7  c r l m e s  i n  t h e  c r i m e  s e r i o u s n e s s  s c a l e ,  f i r s t  . .... , ,. 7 .. - L 
by naking  LP judgmrnts and second by making ME judgments.  For  b o t h  s e t s  of  
jc~dgtaents t i le s t i m u l i  were a r r a n g e d  i n  random o r d e r ,  w i t h  e a c h  s e t  b e g i n n i n g  
v i t h  a  c r i m e  o f  i n t e r m e d i a t e  s e r l o u s n e s s .  S i m i l a r  i n s t r u c t i o n s  and p r o c e d u r e  
were t h e n  used f o r  r a t i n g  t h e  1 0  p r ~ n l s h m e n t s .  I t e m s  making up t h e  two s c a l e s  
a r e  reproduced  below i n  T a b l e  1. I 
L ......................... 
I n s e r t  T a b l e  1 About Here ......................... i 
Respondents  were asked  t o  do  two t a s k s  i n  t h e  d r o p o f f  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  F i r s t ,  
t h e  c r i m e s  were p r e s e n t e d  i n  random o r d e r .  and r e s p o n d e n t s  v e r e  a s k e d  t o  a s s i g n  
e a c h  cr ime an  a p p r o p r i a t e  punishment.  u s i n g  t h e  list o f  t h e  punishment  s c a l e  
i t e m s .  The punishment i t e m s  were  a r r a y e d  i n  t h e  o r d e r  o f  a v e r a g e  s e v e r i t y  - . i 
e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  a  p r e t e s t  and were  a s s i g n e d  l e t t e r s  A t h r o u g h  J. Respondents  i 
were  encouraged  t o  w r i t e  i n  a  r e s p o n s e  i f  n o  punishment  o n  t h e  list seemed 
a p p r o p r i a t e .  T h i s  t a s k  p r o v i d e s  d a t a  f o r  t h e  matching  o f  a n  a b s t r a c t l y  d e f i n e d  
c r i m e  and a n  a c c o m p n ~ ~ y i n g  punishment ,  s i n c e  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ' s  own p s y c h o p h y s i c a l  
s c o r e s  from t h e  main i n s t r u m e n t  c o u l d  b e  a s s i g n e d  t o  e a c h  c r i m e  and e a c h  punish-  
ment.  Second, r e s p o n d e n t s  were  asked  t o  judge  c o n c r e t e  examples  of  c r i m e s ,  
w r i t t e n  a s  b r i e f 4 g n e t t e s .  T h e  t o t a l .  o f  1 b . v i g n e t t e  c r l m e s  i n c l u d e d  an  even  
h e a v i e r  mix of  s e r i o u s - c r i m e s ,  a s  t h e y  v e r e  used t o  o b t a i n  judgments o f  s e v e r a l  
a c t u a l  c a p i t a l  c a s e s .  They a l s o  e x c l u d e d  some o f  t h e  a b s t r a c t  c r i m e s  f o r  which  
i t  was d i f f i c u l t  t o  o h t a i n  examples  o f  t y p i c a l  o f f e n s e s .  (Other  t h a n  t h e  a c t u a l  
c a p i t a l  c a s e s ,  v i g n e t t e  examples  v e r e  a c t u a l  " t y p i c a l "  c a s e s  provlded  by a  
c o n s u l t l n g  l a w y e r . )  Respondents  were asked  b o t h  t o  a s s i g n  p s y c h o p h y s l c a l  
s e r i o u s n e s s  s c o r e s  t o  t h e  v i g n e t t e s  u s i n g  LP judgments  and t o  a s s i g n  punishments  
from a  l i s t  a s  t h e y  had done f o r  t h e  a b s t r a c t  c r i m e  l a b e l s .  These  v i g n e t t e s  
t h u s  p r o v i d e  d a t a  o n  t h e  m t c h  between a  c o n c r e t e l y  d e s c r i b e d  r r l m e  and i t s  
punishment ,  u s i n g  t h e  LP judgments p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  d r o p o f f  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  
s e r l o u s n e s s  and s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e  p s y c h o p h y s l c a l  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  punisllment judg- 
ments made i n  t h e  main i n t e r v i e w  f o r  s e v e r i t y .  For p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s  t h e  
a b s t r a c t  and  v i g n e t t e  t a s k s  p r o v i d e  a n  i n t e r n a l  r e p l i c a t i o n  o n  f i t t i n g  t h e  
punishment t o  t h e  c r i m e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  .of c o n c r e t e n e s s .  
Armed w i t h  psycllophysicaL s c a l e s  f o r  c r i m e  s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment 
s e v e r i t y ,  and w i t h  judgments  from r e s p o n d e n t s  of t h e  p u n i s h n e n t s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
f o r  t h e s e  c r i m e s ,  how would o n e  a s s e s s  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  v h i c h  j u s t  d e s e r t s  is a  
p r i n c i p l e  f o l l o w e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  by i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  a  p r a c t i c e  f o l l o w e d  consen-  
s u a l l y  a c r o s s  i n d i v i d u a l s ?  Such a n  a s s e s s m e n t  r e q u i r e s  a  f o r m a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  
e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e  a t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l  o f  measurement 
Formal iz ing the  P r i n c i p l e  of J u s t  Dese r t s  f o r  T e s t s  of Equity and Consensus 
For tuna te ly ,  w i th  t h e  no t ion  of J u s t  d e s e r t s  ue  can avoid  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
p o s i t i v e  ve r sus  nega t ive  i n p u t s  t h a t  has  s o  f a r  plagued t h e  development of 
s i n g l e  equ i ty  e q u a t i o n s  ( c f .  H a r r i s ,  1976). I n  cons ide r ing  s e r i o u s n e s s  of 
cr ime and s e v e r i t y  of punishment, a l l  i n p u t s  a r e  o f  t h e  same l o g i c a l  type;  t h e  
on ly  i s s u e  is t h e  degree  of s e r i o u s n e s s ,  no t  whether some deeds  a r e  good and 
o t h e r s  bad. Given t h i s  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ,  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  j u s t  d e s e r t s  appea r s  
t o  imply p ropor t iona l  matching o f  cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and p~rnis l~ment  s e v e r i t y .  
t h e  fundamen~al  equa t ion  o f  J u s t  d e s e r t s  is t h e  fol lowing:  
Since e q u i t y  theory is an i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  t heo ry ,  t h i s  equa t ion  
sho111d be t e s t e d  f o r  a l l  personn i and f o r  a l l  cr imes and punlshmcnts j. 
, Elunr lon ( 2 )  can he r e w r i t t e n  a s :  
Since  our  da t a  nre.log-normal,  t h e  logged equa t ion  is  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  one t o  
be e s t lmn ted :  
log P  = l o g  ki + l o g  C 
i . j  1.1 
Th i s  equa t ion .  i n  t u r n ,  i m p l i c i t l y  assumes t h a t  t h e  s l o p e  o f  C  on P is one: i n  
a  regress ion a n a l y s i s ,  t h i s  is an e a s i l y  e s t imab le  parameter .   he' logged 
equot ion then becomes a  f a m i l i a r  r e g r e s s i o n  model: 
l og  E = l o g  k,, + b, l og  C 
i . j  i , J  
T rannfo rwd  back from tlie l o g s ,  t h i s  becomes 
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Equation (6 ) ,  of cou r se ,  is simply an ind iv idua l - l eve l  exp res s ion  o f  t h e  power 
func t ion .  Expression o f  t h e  e q u i t y  equa t ion  i n  t h e  logged form wi th  r a t i o  
d a t a  makes i t  p l a u s i b l e  t o  r e s t a t e  e q u i t y  a s  a  power law, and t o  cons ide r  s l o p e s  
of i n p u t s  on o u t p u t s  t h a t  a r e  o t h e r  than un i ty .  
Equation 5 i s ' t h e  e s t imab le  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  a s  a  
r e l a t i o n  between p ropor t iona l  judgments made by an i n d i v i d u a l .  As a  summiry 
of t h e s e  Judgme~i ts ,  t h e  model i s  po ten t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  respondents '  evnlua- 
t i o n s  o f  matched p a i r s  of cr imes and punishments can be desc r ibed  by t h i s  
l i n e a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  t h e  loga r i thms .  I f  t h e  model a c c u r a t e l y  d e s c r i b e s  i n -  
d i v i d u a l  judgments, a s  shown by high c o r r e l a t i o n  bctween crime se r iousness  and 
punishment s e v e r i t y ,  t hen  t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  (RS o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d )  accoun t s  
f o r  respondents '  answers. Of courRe, i t  does no t  fo l low t h a t  respondents  
need have had t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  c o n s c i o ~ i s l y  i n  mind i n  o r d e r  t o  produce a  
good f i t  t o  t h e  model; bu t  good f i t  does mean t h a t  tlie a n a l y s t  can a t  l e n s t  
conclride t h a t  respondents '  behavior  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  having app l i ed  t h e  p r in -  
c i p l e .  Equation 5 can be e s t ima ted  twice  f o r  each respondent-- once f o r  t h e  
a b s t r a c t  crime l a h e l s  and once f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  v i g n e t t e  examples. For each 
respondent t h e r e  w i l l  be two e s t i m a t e s  of how c l o s e l y  t h e i r  responnes conform 
t o  t h i s  o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  J u ~ t  d e s e r t s  model. 
In f i t t i n g  t h e s e  equa t ions ,  o t h e r  summary s t a t i s t i c - - -  t l ie s lope  and tlie 
i n t e rcep t - -  become a v a i l a b l e .  The s l o p e  c a p t u r e s  t h e  ~ u b j e c t i v e  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  
o f  j u s t i c e :  i . e . ,  t h e  sca l ed  i n c r e a s e  i n  punishment s e v e r i t y  t h a t  accompanies 
a  u n i t  i nc rease  i n  cr ime ser iousness .1°  (See foo tno te  1 0  f o r  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of t h i s  c o e f f i c i e n t  i n  t h e  a n t i l o g  form, equa t ion  6.) The i n t e r c e p t  is t h e  
average " p r o f i t s "  (o r  l o s s e s  i n  t h e  nega t ive  domain o f  punishments) ass igned.  
Thus two d i s t i n c t  s e n s e s  of e q u i t y  con be invoked. The ou tpu t  (punishment) can 
be f i t t e d  t o  t h e  i n p u t  (crime) i n  t he  sense  of p r o p o r t i o n a l i l y :  i . e . ,  any 
u n i t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f - t h e  crime is matched wi th  a  s ca l ed  in-  
c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s e v e r l t y  of t h e  punishment. In  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  t y p i c a l  n e t  
outcome-- t h e  in t e rcep t - -  can be a t  i s s u e .  Even i f  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y ~ h o l d s ,  
i t  may not  seem f a i r  t o  p u ~ i i s h  t h e  t h e f t  of $50 wi th  l i f e  imprisonment'and 
more s e r i o u s  cr imes wi th  p ropor t iona ly  graded deg rees  of t o r t u r e  and humil ia-  
t i o n .  Both t h e  s l o p e  an3 t h e  i n t e r c e p t  i n  t h i s  formulat ion can have i n t e r e s t -  
i ng  equ i ty  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  
To our  knowledge, e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i n  an  e q u i t y  
equat ion have not  p rev ious ly  been made. Indeed, such e s t i m a t i o n  would no t  
be f e a s i b l e  i n  t h e  t y p i c a l  f a c t o r i a l  des ign  i n  which i n p u t s  and outcomes a r e  
o r d i n a r i l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  i n t o  c a t e g o r i e s  such a s  h igh ve r sus  low ( c f .  c r i t i q u e  
-. 
by dams and Freedo.in. 1976). As Adams and Freedman sugges t ,  t h e s e  a c t u a l  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  could  be o f  i n t e r e s t .  Fu r the r ,  s i n c e  two e s t i m a t e s  a r e  a v a i l -  
a b l e  f o r  each respondent ,  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e s e  components of t h e  
i d i o s y n c r a t i c  e q u i t y  equa t ion  can be a s c e r t a i n e d .  
Overa l l ,  t h e r e  a r e  two s e t s  of t e s t s  of t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  a s  a  w i th in -  
i n d l v i d l ~ a l  p a t t e r n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  wi th in - ind iv idua l  cons i s t ency  o f  t h e  s l o p e  
and i n t e r c e p t  terms can be examined t o  s e e  i f  s t a b l e  i d i o s y n c r a c i e s  c h a r a c t e r i z e  
respondents '  matched e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  s e r iousness  and s e v e r i t y .  T h i s  a n a l y s i s  
can a l s o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t e s t i n g  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  s l o p e  and i n t e r c e p t .  
But t h e  more important  i s s u e  is t h e  potency o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i t s e l f  i n  desc r ib -  
i ng  responses .  A s imple  measure of t h e  degree  t o  which t h e  d a t a  f i t  t h e  p r in -  
c i p l e  is t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  t o  punishment s e v e r i t y  w i t h i n  
ind iv idua l s .  T h i s  s t a t i s t i c  i n d i c a t e s  whether people  fo l low t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
of f i t t i n g  t h e  punishment t o  t h e  crime, and f u r t h e r  p rov ides  a  cont inuous  
measure of t h e  degree  t o  which they  do  so .  
There a r e ,  however, two s e p a r a b l e  no t ions  of normative consensus:  use of 
tlie c o g n i t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  and agreement on t h e  s p e c i f i c  s t i m u l i  involved.  The 
t e s t s  f o r  t h e  two a r e  l o g i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t .  Respondents mlght ag ree  t h a t  in-  
c r e a s e s  i n  crime s e r i o u s n e s s  should be matched by i n c r e a s e s  i n  punislimeqt 
s e v e r i t y  wi thout  ag ree ing  on which a c t u a l  c r imes  n re  t h e  more s e r i o u s ,  which 
punishments a r e  more s e v e r e ,  o r  which cr imes should g e t  which punishments. 
Evnluat ions .  of consensus wi th in  and between i n d i v i d u a l s  involve d i f f e r e n t  
t e s t s .  
One measure o f  consensus between i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  e c o l o g t c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  
of t h e  average s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g  of cr imes wi th  t h e  average s e v e r i t i e s  o f  
t h e  punishments t hey  r ece ive .  Such c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  used a s  i n d i c e s  of con- 
s ensus  i n  l i t e r a t u r e s  a s  d i v e r s e  a s  cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and occupa t iona l  p r e s t l g e  
( c f .  Hamblin, 1971; Hodge, S i ege1  and Rossi ,  1964; S e l l i n  and Wolfgang, 1964). 
In  a  s ense ,  t h e  f a c t o r i a l  des igns  of p r i o r  e q u i t y  exper iments  can a l s o  be 
seen a s  e x e r c i s e s  i n  e c o l o g i c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n ,  g iven t h a t  hypotheses  a r e  taken 
a s  nupported when d i f f e r e n t  s t i m u l i  ( i m p l i c i t l y  assurned t o  be  perceived tlie 
same by a l l  respondents)  produce s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  ave rage  responses .  
Yet i t  is w e l l  known t h a t  i t  is  i n v a l i d  t o  i n f e r  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  r e l a t i o n s  
from aggrega ted .da t a  (Robinson, 1950). I n  t h i s  c a s e  such i n f e r e n c e  would be 
t h a t  of i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  conformity  wi th  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  from t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
of t h e  group averages .  It is e q u a l l y  i n v a l i d  t o  i n f e r  agg rega te  agreement 
from i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  conformity. s i n c e  t h e r e  may be between-person d i sag ree -  
ment on t h e  s p e c i f i c s  a s  no ted  above. 
It i a  t hus  u s e f u l  f i r s t  t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  e c o l o g i c a l  l e v e l  c o r r e l a t i o n  
and then  t o  . a s se s s  its r e l a t i o n  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  f i t  o f  punishment t o  
crime. I n d i v i d u a l  d e v i a t i o n s  from group consensus  on e i t h e r  cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  
o r  punishment s e v e r i t y  may be e s s e n t i a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t .  b u t  i t  is important  
t o  t e s t  whether i n d i v i d u a l s '  own dev ian t  pe rcep t ions  o r  r a t i n g s  a r e  neces sa ry  
p a r t s  of a  model p r e d i c t i n g  t h e i r  responses  from t h e  group averages .  I f  
i n d i v i d u a l  pe rcep t ions  a r e  unnecessary. t h e n  one of two conditions must be  ' 
t h e  case:  e i t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  magical ly  a l l  l e a r n  about  c r imes  and punishments 
s o  a s  t o  e v a l u a t e  them i d e n t i c a l l y  w l ~ i l e  t hey  go about  u s ing  t h e  e q u i t y  pr in-  
c i p l e ,  o r  apparent  i n d i v i d u a l  u se  o f  t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  i s  a c t u a l l y  t h e  
s p ~ ~ r i o ~ ~ s  utgrowth o f  conformity  t o  a  s o c i a l  consensus  about  c e r t a i n  s t i m u l u s  
o b j e c t s  and t h e i r  matching. Thus evalw?t ing t h e  r e l a t i o n  between aggrega te  
r a t i n g s  and i n d i v i d u a l  s c o r e s  is c r l r c i a l  t o  demonstra t ing whether both  consensus  
on s o c i a l  f a c t s  and consensus  on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t .  
More impor t an t ly ,  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between aggrega te  and i n d i v i -  
dual r a t i n g s  r e v e a l s  a  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  two n o t i o n s  of consensus ,  
between conformity  t o  t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  and agreement w i th  t h e  aggregate .  
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  respondent  ho lds  t o  t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e ,  
any deviance In e v a l u a t i o n  of a  c r ime ' s  s e r i o u s n e s s  w i l l  be matched by a  c o r r e s -  
pondingly dev ian t  assessment  of t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  s e v e r i t y  o f  punishment. In  
o t h e r  words, consensus  on a  p r t n c j p l e  a t  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  l e v e l  l e a d s  t o  p r i n c i p l e d  
d l s s e n t  from t h e  group when any d i f f e r e n c e  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  s t i m u l i  is encountered.  
A s imple  s t r u c t u r a l  equa t ion  model w i l l  be used t o  t e s t  f o r  t h e  presence and 
magnitude of p r i n c i p l e d  d l s s e n t  nccounted f o r  by adherence t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
of J u s t  d e s e r t s .  
A f i n a l  i s s u e  i s  t h e  p o s s i b l e  presence o f  group-based disagreement  on + 
e i t h e r  t h e  j u s t  d e s e r t s  p r i n c i p l e  i t s e l f  o r  t h e  s o c i a l  s t i m u l i  p re sen ted .  
F o l l u r e  t o  fol low t h e  p r i n c i p l e  can b e  e i t h e r  random, un re l a t ed  t o  any group 
c l eavages ,  o r  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  l i nked  t o  demographic c a t e g o r i e s .  From t h e  
s t andpo in t  of a  c o n f l i c t  ve r sus  consensus  model of c r i m i n a l  j u s t i c e ,  t h e  most 
i n t e r e s t i n g  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  t h o s e  i n d k a t i v e  o f  h i e r a r c h i c a l  s t a t u s  i n  t h e  
socie ty--  r a c e ,  income, and educat ion.  I f  f a i l u r e  t o  f i t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  is 
associated wi th  such c leavages ,  i t  l e n d s  i t s e l f  p a r t i c u l a r l y  v e l l  t o  a  con- 
I f l i c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  g i v e n ' t h e  known s t a t u s  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  
e n t e r i n g  t h e  c r imina l  j u s t i c e  system a s  a  defendant .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  examination 
of t h e  degree  of agreement w i th  t h e  group averages  by d i f f e r e n t  demographic 
groups p rov ides  an  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  whether any groups d i s a g r e e  about  t h e  s o c i a l  
f a c t s  a s  we l l  a s  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  p r i n c i p l e .  Thus t h e  two v e r s i o n s  o f ,no rma t ive  
consensus-- agreement on p r i n c i p l e  and agreement on s t imu l i - -  con be examined 
f o r  t h e  presence of h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  disagreement .  
f i r s t ,  however, a  s imple  ques t ion :  i n  t h e  eye  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  respondent.  
should  t h e  punishment f i t  t h e  crime7 
R e s u l t s  ' 
Equi ty  a t  t h e  Ind iv idua l  Level 
The most s t r i n g e n t  ve r s ion  of t h e  c u r r e n t  model, e q u l t y  a s  an Indivldual-  
l e v e l  povei law, i nvo lves  t h e  b e t a s  f o r  each respondent.  The s l o p e  of 
I punishment on cr ime t n  t h e  logged equation-- t h e  exponent f o r  cr ime i n  t h e  
I ! .. power function-- need not  be 1 .0 ,  a s  ha; been noted,  f o r  a  law-l ike  ve r s ion  
! of matching t h e  two t o  hold .  Thus one ' t ss l ie  is t h e  n;eroRe s i z e 8  of t h e  
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i n d i v i d u a l  b e t a s  i n  t h e  two measurements, t hose  f o r  a b s t r a c t  crime l a b e l s  and 
f o r  s p e c i f i c  v i g n e t t e s .  A second i s s u e  is t h e  range of b e t a s  I n  each. 
'Respondents mig l~ t  show v i d e  ranges  i n  t h e  s l o p e  of punishment on crime. which 
would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  aggregated equa t ion  would no t  adequa te ly  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
ind iv iduo l - l eve l  "law." The s i z e  of t h e  b e t a s  a s  such has  no c l e a n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
a s  i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  can be a  func t ion  o f  s h r i n k i n g  o r  s t r e t c h i n g  e i t h e r  
s c a l e .  For example, a  high b e t a  could r e f l e c t  e i t h e r  a  s t r e t ched-ou t  
punishment s e v e r i t y  s c a l e  o r  a  narrow range i n  t h e  cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  s c a l e .  
I f  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e d  b e t a s  r e f l ec t ed . such  sh r ink ing  and s t r e t c h i n g .  i n d i c a t i v e  - 
of d i f f e r e n t  power laws f o r  d i f f e r e n t  respondents ,  one would expect  t h i s  t o z  
be a  s t a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e  between persons  a c r o s s  t a sks .  Even wi th  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  
b e t a s ,  then,  respondents  could each be fol lowing a  pe r sona l ,  s p e c i f i c  power 
law. Th i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  can be t e s t e d  by examining t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
each pe r son ' s  b e t a s  f o r  t h e  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  t a sks .  A h igh  c o r r e l a t i o n  
would i n d i c a t e  a  c o n s i s t e n t  i nd iv idua l - l eve l  matching of cr ime t o  punishment,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  exponents t h a t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  i d i o s y n c r a t i c  
matching func t ions .  
, % 
Table  2 p r e s e q > t s  t h e  r e l evan t  t e s t s  f o r  s i z e  and cons i s t ency  of t h e  
, b e t a s ,  a s  we l l  a s  t h e  a lphas  and r's t o  which we w i l l  t u r n  next.'' The d a t a  
show a  c l o s e  one-to-one match on t h e  average: t h e  average b e t a s  from both  
t a s k s  a r e  q u i t e  c l o s e  t o  1.0. However, s u b s t a n t i a l  i n d i v i d u a l  v a r i a b i l i t y  
around t.hat average is found i n  both  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  measures. Do 
i n d i v i d u a l s  then each f i t  a  pe r sona l i zed  "law" o r  matching f u n c t i r n  u t i l i z i n g  
t h e i r  own pe r sona l  exponent (be t a )?  As t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  bu t  r e l a L l v e l y  sma l l  
c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e  two b e t a s  i n d i c a t e s ,  t h i s  does n o t  appear  t o  be t h e  
case .  T r e a t i n g  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  a s  a  t e s t - r e t e s t  o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  measure, an r 
of  . 2 5  between t h e  s c o r e s  i s  too low t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  have a  s t a b l e  
p a t t e r n  which they app ly  t o  b o t h , ~ a s k s . ,  Thus t h e  r e s u l t s  argue a g a i n s t  a  
s t r i n g e n t  i nd iv idua l - l eve l  power func t ion  formulat ion of j u s t  d e s e r t s .  
......................... 
I n s e r t  Table  2 About Here ......................... 
The a l p h a s  p re sen t  a  d i f f e r e n t  p i c t u r e  a t  t h i s  l e v e l  of a n a l y s i s .  
Although t h e  i n t e r c e p t s  need not be ze ro ,  they proved t o  be q u i t e  smal l  i n  
bo th  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  t a s k s ,  w i th  lower v a r i a b i l i t y  than t h e  be t a s .  
These a v e r a g e ' i n t e r c e p t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  sma l l 'we igh t ing  cons t an t  i s  necessa ry  
i n  t h e  power ' f u n c t i o n ' f i t  of cr ime t o  punishment ' for  most respondents .  The 
a lphas ,  which r e f l e c t  t h e  average punishment employed by respondents ,  a r e  a l s o  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more s t a b l e  a c r o s s  t h e  two t a s k s .  Fu r the r  evidences  of t h e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  of a lpha  a s  an i n d i c a t o r  of average p u n i t i v e n e s s  were s u b s t a n t i a l  
c o r r e l a t i o n s  between a lpha  and ave rage  punishment s e v e r i t y  ( a b s t r a c t :  1 = .88; 
v i g n e t t e :  1- .68. Both t e s t s  E < .001) and between a lpha  and an average 
o r d i n a l  measure o f  punishment s e v e r i t y  ( a b s t r a c t :  I = . 7 2 ;  v i g n e t t e :  r =  . 5 5 .  
Both t e s t s ,  < .001). Thus respondents '  i n t e r c e p t s  would appear  t o  hold pro- 
I 
mise a s  an  i n d i c a t o r  of i n d i v i d u a l  pun i t i veness ,  a s  i s s u e  t o  which we s h a l l  
t u r n  l a t e r .  
The c e n t r a l  and s i m p l e s t t e s t  of whether t h e  respondents  f i t  t h e  punish- 
ment t o  t h e  cr ime remains t o  be  examined, however. Even i f  t h e  u n r e l i a b i l i t y  
of t h e  b e t a s  f o r c e s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  no t ion  of pe r sona l ,  s p e c i f i c  power laws, 
a  h igh  c o r r e l a t i o n  between cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment s e v e r i t y  would 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  fo l lowing  t h e  e q u i t y  model w i th  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  
monotonic i ty  suggested by l l a r r i s  (1976). As Table  2  i n d i c a t e s .  t h e  c o r r e l a -  
t i o n  between cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and a s s igned  punishment s e v e r i t y  is s u b s t a n t i a l  
f o r  both  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  t a s k s .  There  appea r s  t o  be a  s t r o n g  tendency 
,toward a  monotonic match between t h e  judged s e r i o u s n e s s  of a  cr ime and t h e  
s e v e r i t y  of t h e  punishment one a s s i g n s  t o  it. Hedian wi th in - ind iv idua l  
c o r r e l a t i o n s  of such s i z e  a r e  s t r i k i n g  indeed. 
From one po in t  o f  view, t h i s  tendency t o  f i t  t h e  t o  . the  cr ime 
i n  a  monotonic way is no t  a  s t a b l e  p rope r ty  of i n d i v i d u a l s  a c r o s s  t a s k s .  The 
c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e  two d i f f e r e n t  c o r r e l a t i o n s  produced by each i n d i v i d u a l  
was on ly  .33. (The c o r r e l a t i o n  r a t i o s  were normalized by a  F i s h e r  z- t ransform 
(HcNemar. 1969, p. 157) be fo re  t h i s  c o r r e l a t i o n  was c a l c u l a t e d . )  The q u a l i t y  
of ' . the f i t  of punishment t o  cr ime on one t a s k  i s  n o t  a  very  r e l i a b l e  p r e d i c t o r  
o f  t he  f i t  on t h e  o t h e r  t a sk .  Yet most o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  between c o r r e l a -  
t i o n s  were modest. and t h e  tendency t o  a  s t r o n g  f i t  was c o n s i s t e n t  i n  broad 
p a t t e r n  i f  n o t  i n  d e t a i l ;  82% of t h e  respondents  who completed bo th  t a s k s  had 
c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  cr ime se r iousnens  wit11 punishment s e v e r i t y  o f  g r e a t e r  t han  .5  
on both t a s k s .  The s c a t t e r  p l o t  of t h e  two c o r r e l a t i o n s  showed mainly a  l a r g e  
"bal l"  cen te red  i n  t h e  s e c t o r  where both  c o r r e l a t i o n s  were g r e a t e r  t han  .5 .  
Although t h e  use  of c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  to.eva1uat.e t h e  crime-punishment 
. f i t  l e a d s  t o  d i s c a r d i n g  some of t h e  informat ion from t h e  r a t i o  s c a l i n g  t a s k s ,  
I t  does  I n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  p r l n c i p l e  o f  monotonic i ty  d e s c r i b e s  q u i t e  w e l l  most 
peop le ' s  response t o  t h e  t a s k s .  Within t h e  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  s e t s  o f  
s t i m u l i ,  knowledge o f  one s e t  of judgments. on e i t h e r  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s  
o r  t h e  severities of  a s s igned  punishments. t e l l s  a  g r e a t  d e a l  about  t h e  o t h e r  
s e t  of r a t l ~ ~ g s .  The stnnmary s t anda rd  of good f i t .  both  c o r r e l a t i o n s  .above . 5 ,  
is a r b i t r a r y  and i n c l u d e s  a s  f i t t e r e  some people  whose c o r r e l a t i o n s  were f a r  
s h o r t  of p e r f e c t  l i n e a r  a s soc ia t io r i .  But we t h i n k  i t ' i s  a  fa i r . summory .of . .  
t l iese d a t a  t h a t  most people  who performed t h e  t a s k  Bave responses  t h a t  were 
' 
q u i t e  congruent w i t h  a  monotonic v e r s i o n  of t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of j u s t  d e s e r t s .  t h a t .  
t h e  punishment should €.it t h e  crime. 
Given t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  respondents  demonstra te  a  s t r i k i n g  deg ree  o f  s t r u c -  
t u r e  i n  t h e i r  f i t  of punishment t o  cr ime,  we can then t u r n  t o  t h e  second 
a s p e c t  o f  normnt ive~ 'consensus:  agreement between i n d i v i d u a l s  on t h e  conc re t e  
s t i m u l i .  I n d i v i d u a l s  adhere  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e ,  a l b e i t  n o t  a t  t h e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
l e v e l  of a  power law. Do they a l s o  a g r e e  on t h e  f a c t s ?  
S o c i a l  Consensus on Crimes and Punishments 
The t y p i c a l  i n d i c a t o r  of consensus  i n  much o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  vould be .  
t h e  e c o l o g i c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  between cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment s e v e r i t y .  
In  t h e s e  d a t a ,  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  average s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s  f o r  
each crime and t h e  ave rage  s e v e r i t i e s  o f  punishments a s s igned  a r e  q u i t e  high. 
For t h e  a b s t r a c t  cr imes,  w i th  an n of 17 ( f o r  t h e  1 7  c r imes ) ,  t h e  group-level 
c o r r e l a t i o n  was .98 & - 18.191. p C .0001). For t h e  v i g n e t t e  crimes. w i th  an 
n  of 14 ,  t h e  corresponding f i g u r e  was .97 (r = 15.354. < .001). Thus t h e  - 
average s e r i o u s n e s s  a s s igned  t o  a  cr ime was c l o s e l y  conRrirent wi th  t h e  average 
s e v e r i t y  of t h e  punishment i t  was given.  
Th i s  appea r s  t o  be a  powerful p re l imina ry  i n d i c a t i o n  of consensus between 
i n d i v i d u a l s .  The ques t ion  of consensus might even be rephrased from t h i s  po in t  
. of view t o  a sk  whether i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  ma t t e r  a t  a l l ,  o r  whether we can 
s imply p r e d i c t  any i n d i v i d u a l ' s  punishment assignment on any o f f e n s e  adequate ly  
from knowing t h e  group mean f o r  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  of t h a t  o f f enee .  An even more 
r a d i c a l  ques t ion  can a l s o  be r a i s e d :  do we r e a l l y  need t h e  concept of crimc 
. . 
s e r i o u s n e s s  ns  'an, "input." o r  is cr ime ~ e r i o u s n e n s  simply s su r roga te  measure 
of t h e  average punishment a s s i&ed?12  I s  t h i ~  r & l a t i o n s h i p  sb s t r o n g  t h a t  i t  
must r ep re sen t  two measures o f  t h e  same th ing?  
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of t h e ~ e  i s s u e s  i n  consensus between s u b j e c t s  r equ i r ed  
some mod i f i ca t ions  i n  t r ea tmen t  o f  t h e  d a t a  s e t .  For t h e  f i r s t  t ime,  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  m u l t i p l e  measures were ob ta ined  from each respondent became a  problem: 
thousands of crime and punishment judgments were made, but  t h e  number o f  
respondents  was much sma l l e r .  A s  a  f i r s t  pass  through t h i s  po r t ion  o f  t he  
d a t a  a n a l y s i s ,  a r t i f i c i a l  between-subjecls d a t a  s e t s  were c rea t ed .13  I n  t h e  
case  of t h e  17 a b s t r a c t  cr imes,  17 da t a  s e t s  were-formed; i n  each d a t a  s e t ,  a  
given respondent was r ep resen ted  on ly  once by means of axandom s e l e c t i o n  
c r i t e r i o n .  Within each d a t a  s e t ,  t h e  r e p e t i t i o n  o f  measures was no t  r e l e v a n t .  
The 17  d a t a  s e t s  had s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  ~ ' s  because o f  miss ing d a t a ,  bu t  
averaeed over  280 c a s e s  w i th  roughly equa l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f o r  each crime. The 
same procedure f o r  t h e  14 v i g n e t t e  s t i m u l i  y i e lded  114 d a t a  s e t s  of s i m i l a r  
s i z e  and composition. Across a l l  ana lyses  performed, t h e  m u l t i p l e  d a t a  s e t s  
showed such remarkahle cons i s t ency  i n  r e s u l t s  t h a t  they were pooled i n t o  a  
s i n g l e  l a r g e  d a t a  s e t  ' for : p re sen ta t ion  purposes. .In e f f e c t ,  t h e r e  is e i t h e r  
L r 
a ~ ' n g l e  d a t a  s e t  wCth thounands of c a s e s  f o r  t h e  a b s t r a c t  cr imes,  a s  we l l  
a s  one f o r  t h e  v i g n e t t e s ,  o r  t h e r e  a r e  1 7  quasi-independent r e p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
t h e  same f i n d i n g  .for t h e  a b s t r a c t  cr imes and 14 f o r  t h e  v i g n e t t e s .  Although 
we would be h e s i t a n t  t o  make s i g n i f i c a n c e  t e s t s  o f  r e s u l t s  ,based on t h e  two 
l a r g e  d a t a  s e t s ,  t h e  magnitude of observed e f f e c t s  made such t e s t s  supe r f luous .  
Overa l l ,  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of f i n d i n g s  warranted t h e  s i m p l i f i e d  presentation of 
r e s u l t s .  
Can se r iousness  r a t i n g s  simply be  expla ined away? As a f i r s t  s t e p  i n  
answering t h i s  ques t ion ,  we r eg res sed  both  i n d i v i d u a l  s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s  
and punishment r a t i n g s  on dummies f o r  t h e  cr ime s t i m u l i ,  t o  a s c e r t a i n  how 
much of t h e  va r i aF ion  i n  e i t h e r  r a t i n g  was expla ined s imply by knowing t h e  
s t i m u l i .  I n  t h e  a b s t r a c t  crime s e t ,  w i t h  a  c a s e  base  of 4.595, t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  
o f  punishment on t h e  1 6  dummies f o r  s t i m u l i  produced a  m u l t i p l e  .62 
(g2 .39); t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  of s e r i o u s n e s s  on t h e  dummies y i e lded  a  m u l t i p l e  
r = .67 (U2 = .45).  S imi l a r  r e l a t i o n s  held  i n  t h e  v i a n e t t e s ,  w i th  a  ca se  - 
base  of 3,742: t h e  m u l t i p l e  f o r  punishment was .63 (U2 = .40) ,  and t h e  
m u l t i p l e  5 f o r  s e r iousness  was .72 ( R ~  = .52).  Thus a  g r e a t  d e a l  of t h e  i n d i v l -  
+ d u a l  v a r i a t i o n . i n , b o t h  s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment r a t l n g s , c a n  be accounted 
f o r  slmply .by knowing t h e  s t i m ~ ~ l u s .  
Does knowing respondents '  i n d i v i d u a l  s e r i o u s n e s s  judgments r e a l l y  s ay  any- 
t h i n g  more about  t h e  punishment a s s igned  than j u s t  knoving what t h e  s t imu lus  
was? Table  3  summarizes t h e  subsequent ana lyses  addressed t o  t h i n  i s sue .  The 
l o g i c  involved t h r e e  s t e p s ,  each t h e  same (and wi th  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s )  i n  t h e  two 
sub-data s e t s .  The f i ' r s t  s t e p  was t o  a sk  t h e  r e l a t l o n  of respondents '  punish- 
ment assignment t o  s e r i o u s n e s s  assignment i n  each d a t a  s e t .  I n  t h e  a b s t r a c t  
cr imes,  t h i s  produced a  somewhat lower r and R~ than d l d  t h e  s imple  dummies. 
I n  t h e  v i g n e t t e  .crimes, t h i s  a n a l y s i s  produced r e s u l t s  q u i t e  s i m i l a r  t o  t hose  
f o r  t h e  dummies. I n  both  d a t a  s e t s ,  t h e  second s t e p  was t o  a sk  whether knowing 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  own s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  adds  t o  t h e  va r i ance  ex- 
p l a ined  by t h e  dummies a lone.  Desp i t e  t h e  somewhat worrisome performance o f  
s e r i o u s n e s s  p e r  s e  among t h e  a b s t r a c t  c r imes  i n  t h e  p rev ious  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  R 
2 
was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i nc reased  f o r  both  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  c r imes  by consider-  
i n g ' b o t h  t h e  s t imu lus  and t h e  respondent ' s  unique s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s .  
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The f i n a l  s t e p  i n  Tab le  3 r e p r e s e n t s  a  t w i s t  on t h e  a u l t i c o l i n e a r i t y  
qbserved. . I f  . s t i m u l i  and , s e r iousness  . .- r a t i n g s  a r e  s o  h i g h l y  r e l a t e d ,  t hen  we 
can  e x p l o r e  a f i n a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n :  , r ep l ac ing  t h e  dlmaies  f o r  crime s t i m u l u s  
by t h e  .group ave rage  s e r i o u s n e s s  and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  own s e r i o u s n e s s  ra t ings--  
which, when i n  t h e  same equa t ion  w i t h  group average. becomes t h e  indStr idual0s  
d e v i a t i o n  from t h e  average.  ResYlts f o r  t h i s  equa t ion  s t r o n g l y  resemble t h e  ] 
prev ious  one and r e c o n f i r m ' t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  d e v i a t i o n  o n ' t h e  : I 
s p e c i f i c s  of evaluations. 
These r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  we can,  Indeed, g a i n  something by us ing  t h e  
no t ion  of t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  cr ime a s  an  inpu t  t o  i t s  a s s igned  punishment-- I 
t h a t  s e r i o u s n e s s  is n o t  t h e  same t h i n g  a s  punishment a s s igned .  a l though i t  . 
? 
. c o r r e l a t e s  h igh ly  wi th  i t .  F u r t h e r ,  both  group consensus  and i n d i v i d u a l  
d e v i a t i o n  from consensus  on s e r i o u s n e s s  n r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r e d i c t o r s  of i n d i v i d u a l  
1 
punishment a s s i ~ n m e n t s .  No f u r t h e r  s t e p s  a r e  needed. T e s t s  f o r  whether t h e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  cr ime s t i m u l u s  and its s e r i o u s n e s s  wan needed i n  t h e  ! 
model y i e lded  increments of less then 1% i n  It2 i n  both  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  
I :  
cr imes.  Thus t h e  a n a l y s i s  of consensus between i n d i v i d u a l s  r e v e a l s  both  sub- ]: 
s t a n t i n l  consensus  hnd some room f o r  e f f e c t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  id iosyncracy.  
Although t h e s e  nnnlyses  liave confirmed . the  importance of both  group 
ave rages  and l n d i v l d u a l  tdlos;ncracy a s  de t e rminan t s  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  re-  
I 
sponse. they hnve no t  c l a r i f i e d  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which i n d i v i d u a l  responses  
correspond t o  agreement w i th  t h e  group average.  To do s o  invo lves  s t i l l  
f u r t h e r  s t e p s  i n  p u l l i n g  a p a r t  t h e  e c o l o g i c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  and r e l a t i n g  i t  t o  
appa ren t  use  of t i le p r i n c i p l e  s t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l .  These s t e p s  r e v e a l  t h e  
e x t e n t  t o  wfilcli t h e  remarkable s t r u c t u r e  a l r e a d y  found i n  w i th in - ind iv idua l  
f  i t t  lng o f  t h e  . e q u i t y  model can be accounted f o r . b y  t h e  remarkahle agreement 
between i n d i v i d u n l s  on t h e  s t i m u l i .  ' .  
Decomposing Agreement: Apply&g t h e  P r i n c i p l e  Versus Agreeing wi th  t h e  Group - 
An i n d i v i d u n l ' s  appa ren t  use  o f  a  p r i n c i p l e  l i k e  j u s t  d e s e r t s  can con- 
ce ivab ly  r ep resen t  no th ing  more than r o t e  l e a r n i n g  of how t h i n g s  a r e  u s u a l l y  
eva lua t ed  and pa i r ed  up i n  a  s o c i e t y .  For example, t h e  s o c i a l l y  understood 
s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishments f o r  v a r i o u s  cr imes may 'be l ea rned  by rote-- 
perhaps  through a  p roces s  of r epea ted  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  on TV. i n  t h e  nevspspers ,  
and s o  f o r t h .  Under t h i s  model t h e  group ave rages  r e f l e c t  t h e  outcome of 
t h i s  l e a r n i n g  p rocess  and i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i n g s  a r e  imperfect  r e f l e c t i o n s  of 
t h e s e  aggrega te  s o c i a l  f a c t s .  The e x t e n t  t o  which ind iv idua l . r eaponses  d i s p l a y  
an apparent  p a t t e r n  of j u s t  d e s e r t s  then would no t  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  pe r sona l  
adherence t o  an e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e .  In s t ead  t h e  ind iv idua l  l e v e l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  
would be  a  j o i n t  r e s u l t  of t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  group nverages  dlnplayed a  
monotonic f i t  and t h e  degree  o f  succes s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n . r ep roduc ing  t h e  
g r o u p ~ a v e r a g e s .  
The e c o l o g i c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  of . 98  and . 9 7  certainly demonstra te  n  
monotonic r e l a t i o n  between aggrega te  s e r i o ~ ~ s n e n a  of crime and s e v e r i t y  of i t s  
punishment. The success  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a t  reprodr~cing group ave rages  a l s o  
proves t o  be h igh  f o r  both  s t i m u l u s  s e t s .  The r e l evan t  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  t hose  
between i n d i v i d u a l s '  own s e r i o u s n e s s  s c o r e s  and t h e  group average and between 
i n d i v i d u a l s '  punishment s e v e r i t y  s c o r e s  and t h e  group nverage.  (S imi l a r  
s c o r e s  have i n  f a c t  been used a s  measures o f  normative conaensus I n  p r i o r  
r e sea rch .  no tab ly  by Rossi  g A. 1 9 7 4 . )  For t h e  a b s t r a c t  cr imes.  t h e  
average c o r r e l a t i o n  between an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  seriousness s c o r e  and t h e  group 
mean s c o r e  was .71; t h e  average c o r r e l a t i o n  between punishment s e v e r i t y  and 
t h e  group'mean s c o r e  was .73. For t h e  v i g n e t t e  cr imes t h e  corresponding 
average c o r r e l a t i o n s  w e r e . 7 7  and . 7 5 .  Thus both c o n d i t l o n s  f o r  t h e  appnrent  
product ion of "rule"  l e a r n i n g  hy "rote" l e a r n i n g  wo111d appear  t o  b e  met. 
~ h a ' t  would sucll a  model formal ly  look l i k e ?  The r o t e  l e a r n i n g  ve r s ion  
can be modeled wi th  a  s t r u c t u r e  l i k e  t h a t  In  Figure  1. Model l ( a ) .  Under t h e  
assumptions  of t h i s  model, an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s  a r e  some 
r e f l e c t i o n  o f ' t h e  aggrega te  s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s .  The l r  punishment r a t i n g s  
a r e  a  r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  aggregate  pr~nishment r a t i n g s .  S ince  t h e  f i t t i n g  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  s e r iousness  t o  aggregate  punishment and t h e  f i t t i n g  of i n d i v i d u a l  
punishment t o  agg rega te  s e r iousness  would r e q u i r e  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of an 
ind iv idua l  e q u i t y  p r i n r i p l e ,  t hese  c a u s a l  pa ths  a r e  excluded.  Under t h e s e  
assumptions ,  t h e  ind iv idua l  l e v e l  f i t  of respondents '  s e r i o u s n e s s  judgments t o  
t h e i r  punishment judgments can be found by mul t ip ly ing  around t h e  model (Duncan, 
1976). It would t h e r e f o r e  equal  t h e  product of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s '  f i t  of 
. . se r iousness  t o  aggregate  s e r i o u s n e s s ,  t h e  aggrega te  f i t  of s e r i o u s n e s s  t o  
punishment, and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s '  f i t  of punishment t o  agg rega te  punishment. 
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In Model l ( a ) ,  ar rows have a l s o  beer~ drawn t o  r ep resen t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
. . -> 
bf e r r o r s .  ' ~ 6 e s e  e r r o r s  are-the i n d i v i d u a l s '  d e v i a t i o n s  from t h e  aggrega te  
s e r iousness  and punishment r a t i n g s .  Uncorre la ted d e v i a t i o n s  would i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  t h e  f i t  of t h e  punishment t o  t he  cr ime a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  can be  
accounted f o r  by agreement w i th  t h e  group averages .  The ( p o s i t i v e )  magnitude 
o f  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  of d e v i a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  e q u i t y  
p r i n c i p l e  is r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s '  d e v i a t i o n s :  i n  o t h e r  words, a  
respondent who was dev ian t  on s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s  should tend t c  be dev ian t  
i n  a  c o n s i s t e n t  way on punishment ass ignments .  The c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  e r r o r s  
r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e f f e c t  of applying e q u i t y  a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  a f t e r  we have 
p a r t i a l e d  o u t  t h a t  po r t ion  of t h e  f i t  t h a t  can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  consensus .  
It is a  conse rva t ive  t e s t  f o r  t h e  e x t e n t  of use  of t h e  p r i n c i p l e .  g iven t h a t  
a  p r i n c i p l e d  r u l e  app ly ing  respondent who c o i n c i d e n t a l l y  agreed w i t h  t h e  
group about  t h e  s t i m u l i  would no t  show such c o r r e l a t e d  e r r o r s .  However, 
t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e v i a t i o n s  from t h e  model is unambiguously a  r e f l e c t i o n  
of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e ,  wh i l e  t h e  p o r t i o n  of f i t  
a t t r i b u t a b l e  i n  t h i s  model t o  consensual  fo rces  could r e f l e c t  s imple  r o t e  
l e a r n i n g  r a t h e r  than r u l e  l e a r n i n g .  I f  e q u i t y  a c t ~ ~ a l l y  i e s  i n  t h e  eye of 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  beholder ,  i t  can be fou~ id  through a  conse rva t ive  test by t h e  
sea rch  f o r  c o r r e l a t e d  e r r o r s .  
Model l ( a )  is no t  always a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  a l l  persons  because i t s  assump- 
t i o n s  imply two i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  Uhen t h e s e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  do n o t  
hold e x a c t l y ,  a s  they o f t e n  do no t  w i th  t h e  smal l  number of c a s e s  used t o  
e s t i m a t e  each of t h e  594 a p p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e  model, e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  e r r o r  
c o r r e l a t i o n  t h a t  exceed t h e  boundar ies  of t h e  i n t e r v a l  1-1.+1) can occur .  For 
t h a t  reason,  we a c t u a l l y  e s t ima ted  Model l ( b )  t o  measure t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  of 
t h e  d e v i a t i o n s .  The argument t h a t  c o r r e l a t i o n  of deviations i s  an  e s t i m a t e  
of p r i n c i p l e  adherence t h a t  cannot  be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  r o t e  l e a r n i n g  s t i l l  a p p l i e s  
f o r  t h i s  j u s t  i d e n t i f i e d  model. 
Table  4 p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  s t a t i s t i c s  on t h e  e x t e n t  of c o r r e l a t e d  e r r o r  
f o r  each s e t  of cr ime s t i m u l i .  The average c o r r e l a t i o n s  of e r r o r s  a c t u a l l y  
mask t h e  e x t e n t  of such e r r o r ,  a s  they a r e  a f f e c t e d  by skewed s c o r e s .  Thus 
t h e  sunmaries  i n  Table  4 o f  t h e  median c o r r e l a t e d  e r r o r s  and of t h e  pe rcen t  
of respondents  whose e r r o r s  a r e  p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  a r e  more a p p r o p r i a t e  
i n d i c e s  of use  of t h e  e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  ove r  and above agreement w i th  t h e  group. 
Desp i t e  t h e  modest s i z e  of t h e  average c o r r e l a t i o n s ,  r e s u l t s  c l e a r l y  i n d i -  
c a t e  t h a t  most respondents '  e r r o r s  were p o s i t i v e  ones: when respondents  
dev ia t ed  from t h e  group on t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  an o f f e n s e  they  tended t o  de- 
v i a t e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  on t h e  s e v e r i t y  of t h e  punishment t hey  a s s igned  i t .  
I n s e r t  Tab le  4 About Here ....................... 
T h i s  conclusion-- t h e  f i n d i n g  of p r i n c i p l e  over  and above consensus  on 
fact-- h i d e s  a  s h a r p  edge. Adherence t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  tk p m i s b n t  
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f i t  t h e  cr ime is a c t u a l l y  a  form o fnorma t iveconsensus  t h a t  is q u i t e  imprecise .  
a s  t h e r e  is c o n s i d e r a b l e  l a t i t u d e  l e f t  f o r  d isagreement  about  which punish- . . 
r a n t  should  be f i t  t o  which cr ime.  Fu r the r ,  g iven any s o c i a l  d isagreement  about  
Judgments o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  s t i m u l i  involved,  a  t e n s i o n  emerges: t h e  g r e a t e r  
t h e  adherence t o  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  more sys t ema t i c  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  from t h e  group. 
Consensus on p r i n c i p l e  imp l i e s  p r i n c i p l e d  d i s s e n t  on a p p l i c a t i o n .  
The t w o , s t i m ~ l u s  aetd;tlie a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e . c ~ i m e s ,  represe"t  an 
i n t e r e s t i n g  c o n t r a s t  i n  t h i s  regard.  As Tab le  4  i n d i c a t e s .  t l ie ave rage  c o r r e l a -  
t i o n  of e r r o r s  is l a r g e r  i n  t h e  v i g n e t t e  cr imes.  T h i s  is mathemat ical ly  
i n e v i t a b l e ,  g iven t h a t  t h e  degree  of agreement w i th  t h e  group about  both  
t h a t  i n  t h e  v i g n e t t e s  i nd iv idua l  adherence t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i t s e l f  was h ighe r  
( a s  p re sen ted  i n  Tab le  2) .  The f i n d i n g  s imply demonstra tes  e m p i r i c a l l y  t h e  
po in t  t h a t  g r e a t e r  'adherence t o  p r i n c i p l e  can l e a d  t o  more sys t ema t i c  d e v i a t i o n  
c r imes  and.punishments  was a i m i l a r  i n  t h e  two d a t a  s e t s ,  a s  noted above. and 
from t h e  group. But i t  is concep tua l ly  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  s p e c u l a t e  on why t h e  
v i g n e t t e s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  Because t h e r e  a r e  methodological  d i f f e r e n c e s  be- 
tween tlie p roced r~ res  f o r  t h e  two s t i m u l u s  a e t s .  a s  desc r ibed  i n  t h e  methods 
d l s c t ~ a s i o n .  we cannot be complete ly  conf iden t  about  e x p l a i n i n g  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  
s t ~ b s t a n t i v e l y .  Houever, we a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t l ie g r e a t e r  u se  of t he  
I 
e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h e  v i g n e t t e  cr imes r e f l e c t s  t h e i r  c o n c r e t e  qua l i t y : .  
t h a t  respondents  faced wi th  a  conc re tq  c a s e  a r e  be t t e ;  a b l e  ? r . k r e  w i l l i n g  
t o  l i n k  up t h e i r  assessment  of its s e r i o u s n e s s  w i th  t h e  punishment t hey  mete 
. I 1 
ou t  i n  a  way c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  J u s t  d e s e r t s .  I f  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  is c o r r e c t ,  
then t h e  c l o s e r  t h i n g s  g e t  down t o  cases-- o f  real -world  complexity and 
d e t a i l - -  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  inc idence  and deg ree  o f  p r i n c i p l e d  d i s s e n t  is l i k e l y  
I 
P r i n c i p l e d  d i s s e n t  is an i n t r u i g i n g  no t ion ,  h u t  i t  s t i l l  r e p r e s e n t s  
b a s i c  adherence t o  t h e  a b s t r a c t  norm, i f  not  f u l l  agreement w i th  t h e  group. 
Thus a  f i n a l  probing must be  made. Is t h e r e  any evidence i n  a d a t a  s e t  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by such l a r g e  c o r r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  would po in t  t o  what is normally 
thought of a s  a  c o n f l i c t  r a t h e r  t han  a  consensus? In  o t h e r  words, a r e  t h e r e  
any s o c i a l  groups who f a i l  t o  u se  t h e  p r i n c i p l e ,  f a i l  t o  ag ree  wi th  t h e  
aggrega te  on s t i m u l i ,  o r  both?  
Not play in^ t h e  Came: Demographics and J u s t  Dese r t s  
For a  c o n f l i c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of d isagreement  ahout  j u s t  d e s e r t s ,  t h e  
c e n t r a l  demographic v a r i a b l e s  of i n t e r e s t  a r e  t hose  indicative of h i e r a r c h i c a l  
s t a n d i n g  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y :  race .  income. e d ~ ~ c a t i o n ,  and posa ib ly  sex.  The 
c e n t r a l  i s s u e s  a r e  whether members of nny demographic c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  more o r  
l e a s  l i k e l y  e i t h e r  t o  f i t  tlie punishment t o  t h e  crime o r  t o  ag ree  more c l o s e l y  
w i t h  t h e  average responses  t o  s p e c i f i c  s t i m u l i .  Therefore  t h e  focus s h l f t a  
t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  r e l evan t  w i th in - ind iv idua l  c o r r e l a t i o n s :  t hose  t h a t  
va r ious ly  r e f l e c t  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  and those  t h a t  r e f l e c t  t l ie similarity 
of i n d i v i d u a l s '  judgments of s e r i o u s n e s s  and s e v e r i t y  t o  t h e  average Judgments. 
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Table  5  p r e s e n t s  t h e  zero-order  c o r r e l a t i o n s  of r e l evnn t  demographics w i t h  
a  s e r i e s  of v a r i a b l e s  i n d i c a t i v e  of f i t t i n g  t h e  punishment t o  t h e  crime. a s  
w e l l  a s  w i th  two i n d i c a t o r s  of pun i t i veness  (a lpha '  and average punishment 
s e v e r i t y ) .  A l l . c o r r e l i t i o n s  were norinalized by ~ 1 s h e r " s  c-tra"sform be fo re  
being t r e a t e d  a s  dependent v a r i a b l e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  demographics, i nc lud ing  ' 
t h e  p i r t i a l  5 from F igu re  1, Model l (b ) .15  (See Anderaon, 1958, f o r  t h e  I- 
t r ans fo rm f o r  a  p a r t i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n . )  Where c o r r e l a t i o n s  were nons ign i f i can t .  
they a r e  presented i n  s m a l l e r  type i n  o r d e r  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  vin11n1 p reeen ta t ion  
of t h e  o v e r a l l  p a t t e r n  of r e s u l t s  t h a t  emerged. 
t o  be. 
The p a t t e r n  i s  weak b u t  c l e a r .  Across a l l  measures, b l ack  respondents  
a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  f i t .  They a r e  Less l i k e l y  t o  show a  high f i t  of t h e  punish- 
ment t o  t he  cr ime,  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  ag ree  wl th  t h e  aggrega te  on s e r i o u s n e s s  
judgments, l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  41ow a  high a!pha o r  average punishment assignment.  16 
Across a l l  measures, hi811 income respondents  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  f i t .  They 
show high f i t  of t h e  punishment t o  t h e  cr ime and h igh  l e v e l s  of agreement 
wi th  the  aggregate .  We should s t r e s s  t h a t  no r e s u l t s  a r e  of very  impress ive  
s i z e ,  particularly i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  s i z e s  o f  t h e  consensual  components 
a l r eady  presented.  However, t h e  p a t t e r n s  f o r  r a c e  and income a r e  a t  l e a s t  
c o n s i s t e n t  i f  not  powerful.  
Only t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  f i n d i n g s  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a c r o s s  both  d a t a  s e t s ,  a  
s tandard which would appear  t o  be  a  reasonable  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  any - 1 ... . I .  
p a r t i c u l a r  p i ece  o f  t h e  p a t t e r n .  These r e s u l t s  were t h e  b l ack  tendency t o  
d i s a ~ r e e  wi th  the  aggregate  s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s ,  t h e  high income tendency 
t o  agree  wl th  t h e  aggrega te  punishment r a t i n g s ,  and a  s u r p r i s i n g  tendency 
f o r  males t o  sl~ow h ighe r  l e v e l s  o f  p r i n c i p l e d  d i s s e n t  ( a s  indexed by t h e i r  
p a r t i a l  _r). Since no o t h e r  e f f e c t s  f o r  s ex  were c o n s i s t e n t l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
and some were even i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  r e spec t  t o  s i g n ,  we a r e  l e f t  w i th  no 
p a r t i c u l a r  c l u e s  concerning t h e  meaning of t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  s ex .  
One s e t  of e f f e c t s  is f o r t u n a t e l y  missing. The absence o f  any s i g n i f i c a n t  
e f f e c t s  f o r  educa t ion  makes t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  r ace  and 
income v a r i a b l e s  more c l e a r .  Since  a l l  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  r e l a t e d ,  t h e  
s imul taneous  presence o f  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  o t h e r  e f f e c t s  w i t h  educatfon e f f e c t s  
could  be i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  t e r m  of such i s s u e s  a s  knowledge o r  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  
i n  handl ing a  complex q u e s t i o n n a i r e  t a sk .  These i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  do n o t  
appear  v i a b l e ;  nor d i d  r e g r e s s i o n  ana lyses  i nc lud ing  a l l  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
demographics make them any more s o ,  a s  educa t fon  e f f e c t s  cont inued t o  be  
absen t .  Thus we b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  is  reasonable  t o  assume t h a t  low income 
and b l ack  respondents  knew what was being asked bu t  d i sag reed  wi th  it 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y .  I t - f u r t h e r  appea r s  t h a t  some of t h e i r  l a c k  of f i t t i n g  t h e  
punishment t o  t h e  crime r e s u l t s  from disagreement  about  crime s e r i o u s n e s s  
( i n  t h e  c a s e  of b l acks )  o r  punishment s e v e r i t y  ( i n  t h e  c a s e  of low income 
re sponden t s ) .  Both divergence on use of t h e  p r i n c i p l e  and divergence on per- 
c e p t i o n  of t h e  s t i m u l i  a r e  ev iden t ,  and bo th  appear  t o  be  r e a l  d isagreements  
r a t h e r  t han  func t ions  of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .  
Consis tency i n  t h e  f i t  o f  t h e  punisllment t o  t h e  crime a c r o s s  t h e  two 
t a s k s  can a l s o  be presented i n  a  c ros s - t abu la r  form f o r  e a s e  of v i s u a l i z a t i o n .  
In  o r d e r  t o  do s o ,  a  c a t e g o r i c a l  dependent v a r i a b l e  was cons t ruc t ed  t o  r e f l e c t  
whether one h i t  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of .5  crime-punishment c o r r e l a t i o n  on both  
t a s k s  (82% of t h e  respondents)  o r  n o t .  Table  6 p r e s e n t s  t h e  zero-order  c ros s -  
t a b u l a t i o n s  of bad v e r s u s  good f i t  w i th  r a c e  and inccme, t h e  on ly  s i g n i E i c a n t  
p r e d i c t o r s  of good f i t  by t h i s  measure. Such t a b l e s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  h e u r i s t i c  
d e v i c e s ,  a s  t l te c u t  p o i n t  f o r  c o r r e l a t i o n s  is obv ious ly  a r b i t r a r y  and t h e  c u t  
p o i n t s  f o r  income a r e  somewhat a r b i t r a r y  r e f l e c t i o n s  of t h e  marginal  d l s t r l b u -  
t i o n s .  Neve r the l e s s ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  each demographic t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  
c r i t e r i o n  of good f i t  a r e  v i v i d l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  t a b u l a r  form: t o  be black 
o r  low income means t h a t  one is l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  o u t s i d e  of t h e  group o f  "good 
respondents"  who f a i t h f u l l y  match t h e  punishment t o  t h e  crfme. Higher-order 
t a b u l a t i o n  showed t h a t  among wh i t e  respondents  income con t inued  t o  have a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t ;  t h e  sma l l  number of b l acks  made higher-order  tabu1atio.n 
inappropr i a t e .  
.......................... 
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O v e r a l l ,  t hen ,  d isagreement  on f i t t i n g  t h e  punishment t o  t h e  cr ime i a  
r e l a t e d  t o  h i e r a r c h l c a l  s o c i a l  s t a t u s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  income and r ace .  Desp i t e  
t h e  broad gene ra l  tendency of respondents  t o  f i t  t h e  model, low income and 
b l ack  respondents  show s i g n i f i c a n t  d isagreement .  Yet a o  f a r  a  more s u b t l e  
p o s s i b l e  form of d isagreement  has  been ignored: no t  f i l l i n g  i n  punishment 
responses  on some of o n e ' s  cr ime s t i m u l i .  Only a  few respondents  were miss ing 
an  e n t i r e  task;.many respondents ,  however, a v a i l e d  themselves of t h e  o p t i o n  
of w r l t i n g  i n  a  response on one o r  more s i n g l e  crimes. For t h e  l e a s t  s e r i o u s  
crime-- t a k i n g  $SO-- f u l l y  28X of t h e  sample wrote  i n  o t h e r  answers  f o r  both  
a b s t r a c t  and v i ~ n e t t e  v e r s i o n s  of t h e  crime. On most such w r i t e - i n s ,  re-  
spondents  favored a  punishment of l e s s  t han  two y e a r s ,  which anchored t h e  
provided s c a l e .  These w r i t e - i n s  a r e  o f  cou r se  not  r ep re sen ted  i n  t h e  a s soc ia -  
t i o n  between psychophysical  s c a l e  va lues .  Thus t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  
, responses  from t h e  measures might r ep resen t  an a r t i f i c i a l  i n f l a t i o n  o f  agree-  
ment on tho  p r i n c i p l e .  
Ilowever. t h e s e  miss lng d a t a  prove not t o  i n v a l i d a t e  e i t h e r  t h e  o v e r a l l  
e s t i m q t e  of consensus  on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o r  t h e  assessment of t h e  impact o f  
dcmographlc f a c t o r s .  The s imp les t  summary i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
is  a p p r o p r i a t e  is provided by c o r r e l a t i o n s  between number of mi s s ing  responses  
on psychophysical  va111en (inc.lud!ng both  w r i t e - i n s  ,and s imple  b l anks )  and 
a l l  o t h e r  measures. For both t h e  a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  cr imes,  t h e  number o f  
mi s s ing  psychop l~ys i ca l  v a l u e s  was uncor re l a t ed  wi th  dependent measitres i nd ica -  
t i v e  of f i t t i n u  t h e  model: i . e . .  w i th  both  b e t a s  and wi th  both  r's. Thua 
f o r  t h e  maJor i ty  of respondents ,  having miss ing d a t a  simply r ep resen ted  us ing  
l e s s e r  punishments than were provided i n  t h e  t eak ,  b u t  w i t h i n  t h e  same o v e r a l l  
model of f l t t i n g  t h e  punishment t o  t h e  crime. H i s s ing  d a t a  a t  t h e  individual 
l e v e l  has  no i m p l i c a t t o n  f o r  t h e  o v e r a l l  model. Fu r the r .  t h e  number o f  
miss ing responses  a l s o  had on ly  one s i g n i f i c a n t  demographic c o r r e l a t e  
(wi th  s e x  on t h e  v i g n e t t e  cr imes) ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  conc lus ions  about  
s o c i a l  s t a t u s  need no mod i f i ca t ion .  In summary, t h e  puniahment s c a l e  pro- 
v ided appeared t o  be o v e r l y  ha r sh  from most respondents '  po in t  o f  view, a a  
evidenced by t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  w r i t e  i n  l e s s  ha r sh  a l t e r n a t i v e s  st l e a s t '  
once. But what they appeared t o  want t o  do was t o  extend t h e  game r a t h e r  
than change i t .  
To measure a  norm is a  complex..task. In  t h e  p re sen t  paper we f i r s t  
d i s t l n g r ~ i s h e d  between norms a s  evidenced i n ' b e h a v i o r  and norma a s  evidenced 
i n  t h e  c o g n i t i o n s  of s o c i e t y ' s  members. In  focus ing  on norms a s  c o g n i t i o n s  
held  by i n d t v i d u a l s ,  we then d i s t i n g u t s h e d  between s imple  norms-- r e l a t i n g  
t o  s p e c i f i c  a c t s  o r  p roh ib i t i ons - -  and complex norms-- t hose  r e l a t i n g  s e t s  
of a c t s  o r  o b j e c t s  t o  one ano the r .  Among t h e s e  l a t t e r  complex norms a r e  
included norms of r e c i p r o c i t y ,  exchange, and sanc t ion ing :  i n  s h o r t ,  norms 
of j u s t i c e . .  We argued t h a t  s o c i a l  consensus on such norma can be conceptunl ly  
broken down i n t o  consensus on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  involved and consensus on t h e  
s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  f a c t s  o r  o b j e c t s  of eva lua t ions .  The c o n c e p t u a l i z a t ~ o n  and 
' the measurement of consensus on t h e s e  norms must involve cons ide ra t ion  of 
both potentSa.l  l e v e l s  of agreerirent . 
To measure consensus  on norms of J u s t i c e  i nvo lves  a  comblnatlon UP within-  
i n d i v i d u a l  and between- individual  ana lyses .  To ns ses s  whether i n d i v i d u a l  
members of t h e  p u b l i c  hold  t o  such a  norm a s  a  p r i n c i p l e  i nvo lves  us ing  each 
respondent  a s  an  exper iment  i n  mode l - f i t t t ng .  One needs t o  know how t h e  
i n d i v l d u a l  a s se s sed  t h e  i n p u t s  and t h e  outcomes t o  be exchanged o r  matkhed: 
one needs t o  know how t h e  ind iv idua l  matches them; and one needs t o  have a  
model of t h e  appropr i a t e ,  p ropor t iona te ,  o r  j u s t  matching a g a i n s t  which t o  
a s s e s s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  "model." Consensus on a  norm of j u s t i c e  a s  a  p r in -  
c i p l e  i s  t o  be found w i t h i n  ind iv idua l  members.of t h e  pub l i c .  Consensus on 
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r s  of s o c i a l  s t i m u l i ,  i n  c o n s t r a s t ,  can be .assesscd.by more .. 
s t anda rd  measures of agreement a c r o s s  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Members o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
may ag ree  on t h e  p r i n c i p l e ,  on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  on bo th ,  o r  on n e i t h e r .  
Disagreement may be e i t h e r  random o r  demographically l i n k e d  i n  what is 
q r d i n a r i l y  thought  of a s  a  c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n .  
The complex norm t e s t e d  i n  t h e  p re sen t  d a t a  a n a l y s i s  was t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
j u s t  d e s e r t s  i n  c r i m i n a l  qanc t ion ing ,  t h e  idea  t h a t  t h e  punishment should f i t  
t h e  crime. We Ind ica t ed  t h a t  t h i s  norm has  a c t u a l l y  served a s  t h e  un te s t ed  - 
u3derpinning oE p r i o r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  of consensus on c r i m i n a l  j u s t i c e ,  a s  i n  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  of s e r i o u s n e s s  of crime. Th i s  norm can a l s o  be viewed a s  a  
s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  t h e  no t ion  of e q u i t y ,  a  t o p i c  which has  r ece ived  much r e c e n t  
t h e o r e t i c a l  and empi r i ca l  a t t e n t i o n  w i t h i n  s o c i a l  psychology. Desp i t e  
ex t ens ive  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  equ i ty  i t s e l f  has  never  been t e s t e d  i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
manner desc r ibed  above. The p re sen t  paper t hus  r e p r e s e n t s  a  f i r s t  t e s t  of 
e q u i t y  i t s e l f  a s  we l l  a s  of t h e  s p e c i f i c  s u b s t a n t i v e  i s s u e  o f  w'lether t h e  
a block quota  sample of t h e  Boston SMSA d id  indeed f i t  t i le punishment t o  t h e  
cr ime,  bu t  according t o  a  l o o s e r  monotonic r a t h e r  than p ropor t iona l  matching. 
Within- individual  c o r r e l a t i o n s  between cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment 
. . s e v e r i t y  were . subs t an t i a1 ,  however ... Between-individual agreement on t h e  , 
-- se r iousness  of t h e  cr imes and t h e  s e v e r i t y  of t h e  punishments employed was 
a l s o  s u b s t a n t i a l .  
Two q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  forms of d i s s e n t  were . i d e n t i f i e d ,  h ~ e v e r .  A p a t h .  
model of t h e  r e l a t i o n  between aggrega te  consensus  on s t i m u l i  and i r id ivldunl  
fo l lowing of t h e  p r i n c i p l e  r evea led  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of what we have c a l l e d  
p r i n c i p l e d  d i s s e n t :  t h a t  when any disagreement  e x i s t s  about  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  
of s p e c i f i c  s t i m u l i ,  t h e  more an ind iv idua l  ho lds  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h e  more 
sys t emnt l c  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  d e v i a t i o n  from t l ~ e  group average.  In  p r e d l c t i n g  
i n d i v i d u a l  r e l a t i o n s  of j u s t i c e  from aggregate  r e l a t i o n s ,  c o r r e l a t e d  e r r o r s  
i n  a  pa th  model a t e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  imposes g r e a t e r  c o g n i t l v e  
s t r u c t u r e  t han  would be p r e d i c t e d  from consensus i n  t h e  sense  of agreement 
w i th  group averages .  Thus consensus on p r i n c i p l e  imp l i e s  p r i n c i p l e d  d i s s e n t .  
A second ve r s ion  of d i s s e n t ,  t h e  more f a m i l i a r  demographic c leavage.  
was a l s o  i d e n t i f i e d  on both  adherence t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  and agreement w i th  
group averages .  The c o n s i s t e n t  p r e d i c t o r s  of no t  f i t t i n g  t h e  punishment 
punishment f i t s  t h e  crime. t o  t h e  cr ime were t e l l i n g  ones: income and race .  Lover income o r  b l ack  
In  o r d e r  t o  t e s t  j u s t  d e s e r t s  a s  a  norm, psychophysical ly  v a l i d a t e d  r a t i o  respondents  were l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  e x h i b i t  t h e  high c o r r e l a t i o n s  between cr ime 
s c a l e  measures o f  crime s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment s e v e r i t y  were used a s  t h e  I s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment s e v e r i t y  which o the rwi se  pervaded t h e  d a t a  s e t .  
i n d i c a t o r s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s '  s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  t h e  i n p u t s  and outcomes The absence of educa t ion  e f f e c t s  on  t h e s e  same c o r r e l a t i o n s  makes i t  u n l i k e l y  
t o  j u s t i c e .  The model f i t t e d ,  de r ived  from both  psychophysics and e q u i t y  1 t h a t  t h e  disagreements  by income and r a c e  a r e  e f f e c t s  o f  e i t h e r  s o p h i s t i c a -  
theory.  was one of p r o p o r t i o n a l  match between t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  a  cr ime and ! 
C 
t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  punishment a s s igned  t o  it. R e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  members of ! 
t i o n  a t  such t a s k s  o r  knowledge o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  norms. Income and r a c e  a l s o  
from 
r e l a t e d  t o  d i v e r g m c e  / group ave rages  i n  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s t i m u l i  involved.  
Higher income respondents  were m r e  l i k e l y  t o  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  average on 
prlnislmments, wh i l e  b l ack  respondents  were l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  a g r e e  wi th  t h e  sve rage  
on cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s .  Thus conf l i c t - -  of a  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r a l l y  meaningful 
var ie ty--  was i d e n t i f i e d  both  on adherence t o  j u s t  d e s e r t s  i t s e l f  end on 
e v a l u s t i o n  of t h e  s o c i a l  s t i m u l i  making up t h e  equa t ion  of t h e  punishment end 
t h e  crime. 
By e i t h e r  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of consensus on p r i n c i p l e  o r  t h a t  of consensus  on 
s o c i a l  f a c t s ,  j u s t  d e s e r t s  appea r s  t o  warrant  belng c a l l e d  a  norm-- d e s p i t e  
tl ie ev idences  of c o n f l i c t  found. B I I ~  t o  measure a  norm is no t  t o  conf i rm a  
n o r n a n d  we a r e  s t r u c k  by t h e  p o s s i b l e  meaning of t h o s e  ev idences  of c o n f l i c t .  
I t  i~ s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  d i s a g r e e i n g  respondents  d i d  n o t  unders tand t h e  t a s k  
a t  hand. but  i t  seems a t  l e a s t  a s  l i k e l y  t h a t  they unders tood i t  a l l  t oo  we l l .  
To measure a  s i n g l e  norm invo lves  l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  what i s  p re sen ted  and i n  what 
can be found. The t a s k  p re sen ted  was one which evoked, and e s s e n t i a l l y  a l lowed,  
on ly  a  s i n g l e  Frame o f  r e f e rence  f o r  j u s t i c e  and on ly  a  s i n g l e  b a s i s  o f  J u s t i c e :  
d e s e r t .  
J u s t  d e s e r t s  is not  t h e  on ly  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e .  As Anatole  France 
remarked. "The lnw, i n  i t s  maJes t i c  e q u a l i t y ,  f o r b i d s  t h e  r i c h  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
poor t o  s l e e p  under b r i d g e s ,  t o  beg i n  t h e  s t r e e t s ,  and t o  s t e a l  bread." 
Th i s  t ens ion .  t h e  i n j ~ ~ s t i c e  of j r t s t i c e ,  pervades t h e  s t a n d a r d s  of s system 
of c r imina l  law. Equi ty  i n  meting ou t  punishments acco rd ing  t o  d e s e r t  can 
c l a s h  wi th  p r l o r  i~ req r t i t y  i n  met ing o u t  rewards according t o  d e s e r t .  Or need. 
Or r i g h t s .  Tlte bulk  o f  e q u i t y  research.  i nc lud ing  o u r  own, has  focused on 
a l l o c a t i o t t  of rewards o r  punishments according t o  a  s i n g l e  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h a t  of 
d e s e r t .  I n  d t s c u s s i n g  t h e  r e l a t e d  a r e a  of exchange theo ry ,  Heath (1976) has  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  r e s e a r c h  a s  be ing  ninglemindedly focused on d e s e r t  a s  t h e  
s o l e  b a s i s  o f  J u s t l c e .  Heath concludes  t h a t  such a  focus  i s  no t  t h e  on ly  
p o t e n t i a l l y  applicab1.e r u l e ,  bu t  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  and p o t e n t i a l l y  competing 
r u l e s  can invo lve  need o r  - r i g h t s  r a t h e r - t h a n  d e s e r t .  A focus- on d e s e r t .  
Heath a rgues ,  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  l i k e l y  t o  emerge i n  a  l i b e r a l  c a p i t a l i s t  s t a t e .  
' A s  Homans (1976) noted ( i n  speaking of equ i ty  t h e o r i s t s '  optimism r a t h e r  
t han  t h e i r  capital'ism).'"How l i b e r a l  and-how American t h e s e  essumptions a r e l "  
Market p r i n c i p l e s  o f  r e sou rce  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  a s  opposed t o  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  
evoke r i g h t s  t o  goods o r  needs f o r  goods, have long  heen a t . t h e  c o r e  of ou r  
I s o c i a l  ar rangements .  And market ar rangements  a r e  a  form of s t a b i l i z e d  power 
d i f f e r e n c e s  (Giddona. 1973). I n d i v i d u a l  a c t s  t h a t  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e l y  circumvent 
t h e s e  arrangements  a r e  regarded a s  cr imes.  To t u r n  around t h e  s ta tement  of 
demographic d i f f e r e n c e s ,  u e  could  say  t h a t  h ighes t  agreement w i th  f i t t i n g  t h e  
punishment t o  t h e  crime was shown by those  who can be presumed t o  b e n e f i t  
most from tlie s anc t ioned  d i s t r i b u t i v e  arrangements o f  work and c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  
I 
high income o r  wh i t e  respondent .  
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I Thus competlng p r i n c i p l e s  of j u s t i c e  can r e a d i l y  be found. In t h e  p re sen t  
I 
i s tudy ,  on ly  a  s i n g l e  o rgan iz ing  p r i n c i p l e  waR a v a i l a b l e ;  demogrspltic d i s -  
i 
I 
agreements were a c t u a l l y  t endenc le s  t o  f i t  t h e  s i n g l e  model l e s s  w e l l .  T h i s  
I s tudy.  l i k e  a l l  o t h e r s  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  evoked nnly a  s i n g l e  frame o f  re- 
1 f e rence  f o r  judging what Is e q u i t a b l e .  One can c e r t a i n l y  imagine an a l t e r n a t i v e  
p u r i f i e d  frame, suclt a s  t h a t  of need. The a l l o c a t i o n  of b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  needy 
f could be eva lua t ed  i n  a  r e sea rch  jnntrument modeled on t h e  one employed i n  
t h i s  s tudy.  f o r  example. by d e s c r i b i n g  c a s e s  from t h e  New York Times annual  
tlundred Needies t  (perhaps  anchor ing t h e  s c a l e  wfth an unneedy p l u t o c r a t  o r  
i two). It can a l s o  t ake  very l i t t l e  t o  evoke a  s h i f t  o f  frame wi th in  t h e  
1 respondent t o  an a l t e r n a t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  of j u s t i c e .  Th i s  would presumably 
I 
! be accomplislied by then d e s c r i b i n g  one o f  t h e  r e c e n t l y  ranked n e e d i e s t  a s  t l te 
p e r p e t r a t o r  of a  b r u t a l  mugging. One can even make t h e  p o i n t  of view r e a l l y  . . * 
s p i n ,  by then desc r ib ing  t h e  v i c t i m  a s  a  weal thy misanthrope who j u s t  l augh ing ly  
bounced a  l a r g e  check t o  tile c h a r i t y .  
Presumably,- respondents  would ,become q u i t e  angry i E  they were sub jec t ed  t o  
such a n t i c s ,  but  t h e i r  f r u s t r a t i o n  would on ly  be matched by t h a t  of t h e  d a t a  t - I 
a n a l y s t  t r y i n g  t o  make sense  ou t  of such nonsense. It would obviously  be  poor 
r e sea rch  design t o  haphazardly inc lude  d e s c r i p t i o n s  whose v a r i o u s  e lements  
evoked d i f f e r e n t  frames of r e f e rence  wi th  r e spec t  t o  j u s t i c e .  But i t  is a l s o  
nonsense f o r  t h e  r e sea rche r  who has  denionstrated t h a t  respondents  can and do 
use  one frame of r e f e rence  t o  conclude t h a t  i t  is t h e  on ly  one. 
The p re sen t  s tudy i n v e s t i g a t e d  a  s i n g l e  norm and evoked a  s i n g l e  frame of 
r e f e rence  from most r,espoq$e:~ts. We c a n n q t - n o w  t h e  reason f o r  lower adherence . .,*. . . - +  -. 
t t  t he  p r i n c i p l e  c f  j u s t  d e s e r t s  among low income and b l ack  respondents .  a l t hough  
we can suspec t  t h a t  t h e  answer has  t o  do  w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e  frames of r e f e r e n c e  
f o r  j u s t i c e .  Ca re fu l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of competing p r i n c i p l e s ,  a s  opposed t o  t h e  
h e l t e r - s k e l t e r  frame s h i f t  e x e r c i s e  desc r ibed  above, could  he lp  t o  c l a r i f y  such 
i s s u e s .  A l loca t ion  of punishments could  be t e s t e d  f o r  evidence of use  of a  
p r i n c i p l e  l i k e  need a s  we l l  a s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  d e s e r t .  A l loca t ion  o f  d i s t r i -  
b u t i v e  rewards could  a l s o  be  examined a s  a  problem i n  competing J u s t i c e  r u l e s .  
I f  they a r e  asked,  respondents  might prove t o  u t t l i z e  q u i t e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  




1. The s t a t i s t i c a l  freqrrency o r  infrequency of a  behavior  is a  guide  to  t he  
p r e s c r i p t i o n  o r  p r o s c r i p t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  ways of a c t i n g .  Sanct ioning,  
w whether p o s i t i v e  o r  nega t ive ,  i s  a  socie ta l .mechanism f o r  en fo rc ing  appro- 
* . 1 p r i a t e ~ b e h a v i o r .  And c o d i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e  embodiment of i d e a l s  i n  w r i t t e n  ,. . . , . 
codes, is a  s t r a t e g y  f o r  long-term maintenance and t ransmiss ion of t h e  
norm. 
2.  Among the  v a r i e t y  of con f i rma to ry  s t u d i e s  a r e  those  by Akman, Normnndeau. 
and Turner (1967). Normandeau (1966). and Velez-Diaz and Hegargee (1970). 
3. Three o t h e r  s t u d i e s  have addressed both  cr ime se r iousness  and punishment 
s e v e r i t y .  Each appea r s  t o  assume t h e  norm i n  ways s i m i l a r  t o  S e l l i n  and 
Wolfgang (1964) o r  R o s s i c & .  (1974). The e a r l i e s t  s tudy ,  by Rose and 
P r e l l  (1955). had respondents  do Thurs tone s c a l e s  f o r  both s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  
c r imes  and s e v e r i t y  of punishments.  The major po in t  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e  was 
t h a t  r a t e d  s e r i o u s n e s s  of t h e  1 3  minor f e l o n i e s  they used a s  s t i m u l i  d i d  
not  correspond to  r anges  of a c t u a l  punishments,  which they took a s  evidence 
of c l a s h  between law and normative s t r u c t u r e .  The a u t h o r s  a l s o  had respon- 
d e n t s  a c t u a l l y  a s s i g n  punishments t o  t h e  cr imes.  b u t  focused on ly  on 
demographic d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r a t e s  and e f f e c t  o f  manipulated o f f ende r  cha r -  
a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  ana lyz ing  punishment ass ignments .  Gibbons (1969) was a l s o  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  between p u b l i c  sent iment  and l e g a l  p r a c t i c e s .  
they might even judge i n p u t s  a s  a  func t ion  of a b i l i t y  wh i l e  they judge o u t p u t s  ? His i n d i c a t o r  of t h e  perceived s e r i o u s n e s s  of o f f e n s e s  was t h e  punishments 
a s  a  func t ion  o f ,need .  What is most l i k e l y  is t h a t  they w i l l  s t r u g g l e  w i th  which respondents  a s s igned  t o  them. F ina l ly .  White (1975) i n v e s t i g a t e d  
t h e  var iol ls  p o t e n t i a l  i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  i n  ways t h a t  r e f l e c t  t h e  complexi ty  j e f f e c t s  o f  manipula ted o f f e n d e r  and v i c t i m  s t a t u s  on  s e v e r i t y  o f  punish- 
o f  m u l t i p l e  competing p r i n c i p l e s  of j u s t i c e .  Competing j u s t i c e  norms, r a t h e r  ment. He found n e g l i g i b l e  e f f e c t s  of t hese  v a r i a b l e s ,  b u t  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
t han  disagreement about  a  s i n g l e  norm, may prove t o  be  t h e  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n  4 e f f e c t  of cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  on punishment. In h i e  s tudy,  s e r i o u s n e s s  was 
f o r  s t u d e n t s  o f  s o c i a l  consensus. o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d  by a s s i g n i n g  Sellin-Wolfgang r a t i n g s  t o  t h e  s t i m u l i ;  
punishment s e v e r i t y  was t h e  o r d i n a l  12-point  s c a l e  employed by Gibbons. 
Thus Vhi te 'a  s t u d y  d i f f e r s  from t h e  p r e s e n t  one i n  h i s  s u b s t a n t i v e  focus  
and i n  h i s  imposi t ion o f  s c a l e  s c o r e s  r a t h e r  t han  o b t a i n i n g  s u b j e c t i v e  
r a t i n g s  from t h e  e c t w l  respondents .  
Brickman (1977) has  r e c e n t l y  p re sen ted  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  concept ion o f  how 
c r imina l  j u s t i c e  might be o rgan ized  around v i c t i m  r e s t i t u t i o n  r a t h e r  than 
o f f ende r  punishment. The r e s t i t u t i o n  v e r s i o n  o f  c r imina l  j u s t i c e  is more 
c l o s e l y  l i nked  t o  s t anda rd  e q u i t y  theory fo rmula t ions  o f  j u s t i c e ,  a s  w e l l  
a s  t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of Anglo-American c i v i l  law. We should s t r e s s  t h a t  
t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  c r imina l  j u s t i c e  "equity" i n  t h e  p re sen t  paper is based 
on the  way the  system appea r s  t o  be c u r r e n t l y  o rgan ized ,  and does  no t  
r e f l e c t  ou r  views o f  how i t  should be organized.  
In a s s e s s i n 8  the  d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e  of pay outcomes. J a s s o  and Ronsi 
(1977) have r e c e n t l y  produced a  methodological  and conceptual  advnnce hy 
exp lo r ing  the  e f f e r t  of va r ioun  real -world  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  (e .g . .  s e x  and 
m r l t a l   tatu us) on whether p re - spec i f i ed  e a r n i n g s  a r e  perceived a s  f a i r  by 
a d u l t s .  Thus they have begun t o  a s s e s s  t h e  bases  o f  t h e  unde r ly ing  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  r u l e  i t s e l f .  In a d d i t i o n ,  they e x p l o r e  consensus  i n  terms of 
demogrnphlc d i f f e r e n c e s  on t h e s e  judgments. However, t h e i r  measurement 
technique does  not  a l l o w  them t o  make use  o f  t h e i r  wi thin-respondent  des ign  
in  t he  mnnner suggested below; to  do s o  they would need t o  o b t a i n  respon- 
d e n t s '  own s u b j e c t i v e  Judgments of t h e  i n p u t s  and outcomes pe r  s e  and 
respondents '  own ass ignments  of outcomes f o r  i n p u t s .  
Ea r ly  inves t jga t fona  of t h i s  type tended to  v a l i d a t e  t h e  s c a l e s  ob ta ined  
a g n i n s t  o t h e r  ca t egory  s c a l e s  f o r  t h e  same dimension o r  a g a i n s t  o t h e r  r e l e -  
vant  v n r i a b l e s .  S e l l i n  and Wolfgang's (1964) u se  of t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  of 
t h e i r  s c a l e  measures w i th  punishments i n  Pennsylvania i s  an example of such 
v a l i d a t i o n  procedures .  More r e c e n t  procedures  f o r  v a l i d a t i n g  psycho- 
phys i ca l  s c a l e s  f o r  s o c i a l  op in ion  r e s t  on a  procedure  used f o r  phys i ca l  
s t i m u l i  known a s  cross-modal i ty  matching. With phys i ce l  s t i m u l i ,  c ros s -  
modal i ty  matching c o n s i s t s  of having s u b j e c t s  a d j u s t  one s c a l a b l e  s t imu lus  
t o  match ano the r  (e.g.,  a d j u s t i n g  t h e  perceived b r i g h t n e s s  o f  a  l i g h t  t o  
match t h e  weight of s n  o b j e c t ) ;  t h e  funcrion de r ived  r e f l e c t s  t h e  r a t i o  of 
t h e  two ind iv idua l  moda l i t i e s .  For op in ions  about  a s o c i a l  s t i m u l u s ,  
i n d i r e c t  cross-modal i ty  matching can be used a s  a  v a l i d a t i o n  technique.  I 
i Sub jec t s  i n d i c a t e  the  i n t e n s i t y  o f  t h e i r  judgments of a  s o c i a l  s t i m u l u s  by 
I 
a d j u s t i n g  responses  t o  one phys i ca l  modal i ty ,  matching t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  
I response t o  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  of opinion:  second, they r epea t  t h e  procedure  
I 
1 us ing  a  d i f f e r e n t  p h y s i c a l  modal i ty ;  f i n a l l y .  an  i n d i r e c t  cross-modal i ty  
match is achieved by p l o t t i n g  t h e  responses  made t o  t h e  same s o c i a l  s t imu lus  
on the  two m o d a l i t i e s  a g a i n s t  one ano the r .  I f  t he  s o c i a l  s t i m u l i  indeed 
c o n s t i t u t e  a  s i n g l e  r a t i o  s c a l n b l e  dimension. t he  r e s u l t i n g  match produces 
a  power func t ion  whose exponent is approximately  t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  char-  
a c t e r i s t i c  exponents  of t h e  two m o d a l i t i e s  (see ,  e .g . ,  Dawson and Brinker.  
1971 ). 
7. Each respondent  i s  allowed to  s e t  a  s t anda rd  o r  "mdulua"  wi th  the  f i r s t  
response g iven  by a s s ign ing  a number to  t h e  f i r s t  s t i m u l ~ ~ s  i n  ME judgments 
. .. 
and drawing a ' l i n e  f o r  t he  f i r s t  s t imu lus  i n  1.P judgments. These a r e  sup- 
posed t o  r ep resen t  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s / s e v e r i t y  o f  t h a t  atimulun. Al l  o t h e r  
s t i m u l i  a r e  judsed r e l a t i v e  t o  t he  f i r s t ;  respondents  u ive  numhers o r  draw 
l i n e s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  p ropor t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  of t h e  s t i m ~ l l i .  For example. 
i f  they f e e l  a  cr ime is twice  a s  s e r i o u s  a s  t h e  f i r s t  they should a s s i g n  a  
nr~mher twice a s  b i g  o r  draw a  l i n e  twice a s  long.  The d a t a  a r e  then 
analyzed a s  desc r ibed  i n  t h e  t e x t .  
8. Blocks were drawn i n  p ropor t ion  t o  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e  1970 census  and 
an  a d d i t i o n a l  e i g h t  b locks  were s e l e c t e d  i n  which on ly  b l ack  respondents  
were e l i g i b l e ,  based on 1970 census  b locks  wi th  20% o r  h ighe r  b l ack  popu- 
l a t i o n s .  This  s t r a t e g y  was chosen t o  ensu re  adequate  b l ack  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
i n  t he  ove ra l l* sample .  In t e rv i ewers  were ass igned randomly t o  blocks .  
wi th  quo ta s  imposed f o r  s e x  and age  of respondents .  A t o t a l  o f  391 i n t e r - '  ' 
views were obta ined o f  an o r i g i n a l  goa l  o f  400 in t e rv i ews .  
9 .  These tec l in ical  c o r r e c t i o n s  a r e  f o r  what is known a s  r e g r e s s i o n  e r r o r .  
Cross (1974) and Lodge sfi. (1974) have developed procedures  f o r  ob ta in -  
ing unbiased e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  e r r o r s  on t h e  phys i ca l  v a r i a b l e s  
used i n  cross-modal matching. Thin methodological  advance f r e e s  t h e  
r e sea rche r  from t h e  assumption of no e r r o r  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  of one physl- 
c a l  var iabJe  a g a i n s t  . t h e  .o ther ,  p rov ides  a , c r i t e r i o n  f o r  accep t ing  o r  " 
" - . . 
- e j e c t i n g  the  r e c u l t s  of cross-modal matches, and p rov ides  a  means f o r  
d e r i v i n g  unbiased s c a l e s  of op in ion  from these  senso ry  matching func t ions .  
The p re sen t  paper d i d  no t  employ r e g r e s s i o n  c o r r e c t i o n s ,  because t h e s e  a r e  
made on group- level  r a t h e r  than ind iv idua l - l eve l  d a t a .  P rev ious  a n a l y s e s  
have shown r e g r e s s i o n  b i a s  t o  be minimal i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  d a t a  s e t  (Hamilton 
and Rotkin. 1978). 
10. A c o n s i s t e n t  non-zero b e t a  of whatever magnitude would be i n d i c a t i v e  o f  a  
law-l ike  f i t t i n g  o f  s e r iousness  t o  s e v e r i t y .  A b e t a  equa l  t o  u n i t y  would 
d e s c r i b e  a  f i t  t h a t  corresponds t o  t h e  usua l  n o t i o n  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y .  
Under such a  f i t ,  a  doubl ing of t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  i n p u t  vould c a l l  f o r a  doubling 
o f  t he  s e v e r i t y  ou tpu t . .  A b e t a  equa l  t o  "two" would i n d i c a t e  a  f i t  where a  
doubl ing of t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  i npu t  would c a l l  f o r  a  quadrupl ing of t h e  
s e v e r i t y  ou tpu t .  A be ta  equa l  t o  1.73 would mean t h a t  a  doubl ing of s e r i -  
ousness  was matched wi th  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  s e v e r i t y  equa l  t o  z"'~. Such 
power laws wi th  non-unit exponents a r e  common i n  the  s u b j e c t i v e  s c a l i n g  
of phys i ca l  i n p u t s  t h a t  is t h e  c e n t r a l  concern of psychophysical s c a l e r s .  
1 For example, doubl ing the  loudness  of a  sound sou rce  r e s u l t s  i n  a  s u b j e c t i v e  
67 1 i n c r e a s e  i n  i n t e n s i t y  of 2' . j . . , ,. , ..,..,, , . , ,  . :. . . _ . _,. _A : 
11. The n for. ' t l i&+e a"nalyseA is redubed €ram ,314 ' t o  '297 because  we inc lude  on ly  
. .  . .. . 
t hose  respondents  who have both  s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment s c o r e s  f o r  both  
1 
i a b s t r a c t  and v i g n e t t e  cr imes.  Th i s  i nc ludes  r e s w n d e n t s  who have some 
miss ing d a t a  b u t . f o r  whom reg res s ion  l i n e s  can s t i l . 1  be computed. 
12. We thank Robert Zajonc f o r  r e m v l n g  t h e  Durkheimian wool from our  eyes  and 
f o r c i n g  u s  t o  acknowledge t h e  p o t e n t i a l  spu r iousness  of s e r i o u s n e s s  judg- 
ments. In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  evidence provided a g a i n s t  t h i s  i n  t h e  t e x t .  
evidence a c r o s s ' p r i o r  s t u d i e s  is a l ~ o  n ~ i p p o r t i v e  o f  t h e  view t h a t  s e r i o u s -  
nes s  is a  judgment d i s t i n c t  from a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of t y p i c a l  punishments.  
In  Hamilton and Rotkin (1976). t h e  HE and LP s e r i o u s n e s s  judgments followed 
the  punishment judgments; i n  Ilamilton and Rotkin (1976). they preceded 
punlsliment judgments. The s i m i l a r i t y  o f  s r a l e  r ange  and r ank  o r d e r i n g  
between t h e  two d a t a  s e t s  sugges t s  t h a t  s e r i o u s n e s s  judgments pe r  s e  a r e  
una f fec t ed  by cons ide r ing  punishments per  s e .  
13. Th i s  n o t i o n  o f  c r e a t i n g  quasi - independent  r e p l i c a t e s  was suggested by 
Kenneth Guire  of t h e  S t a t i s t i c a l  Research Laboratory .  Un ive r s i ty  of Michigan. 
I The problem v a s  e s p e c i a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  i n  t h e s e  d a t a  because  o f  t h e  way i n  
which they were prepared.  S ince  we s u b t r a c t e d  o u t  t h e  mean of each  i n d i -  
v i d u a l ' s  logged responses ,  i t  is impossible  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  t o  
be e s t ima ted  by a n  a d d i t i v e  model: 
- '  
14. One a l t e r n a t i v e  exp lana t ion  o f  d e v i a t i o n s ,  coding e r r o r .  can be dismissed.  
Examination o f  a  s u b s e t  o f  h igh ly  d e v i a n t  c a s e s  r evea led  no e r r o r s  i n  coding.  
such a s  a  r e v e r s a l  of one  s c a l e  o r  ano the r ,  t o  p rov ide  a  comfor t ab le  
exp lana t ion  o f  t h e  sometimes ze ro  and o c c a s i o n a l l y  nega t ive  r e l a  t i o n s h i p s  
found. Aside from s h e e r  i d iosync rasy  (which i n d i v i d u a l  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  
e x h i b i t e d  i n  numerous c r e a t i v e  ways), d i f f e r e n c e s  would t h e r e f o r e  appea r  
l i k e l y  t o  be demographical ly  caused. 
15.  Rosai. Uai te .  Bose and Berk (1974) performed a s i m i l a r  a n a l y s i s  on squared 
c o r r e l a t i o n s  of i n d i v i d u a l s  w i th  aggrega te  s e r i o u s n e s s  r a t i n g s .  The r a t i o -  
n a l e  f o r  squa r ing  the  c o r r e l n t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  was no t  o f f e r e d  bu t  i t  doea 
reduce t h e  akew i n  t h e  marginal  d i a t r i b r l t i o n  and r e s r ~ l t n  i n  a  m e t r i c  w i th  
which sociologists a r e  q u i t e  a t  home. However, t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
of t h e  srltwre t r ans fo rma t ion  a r e  no t  a s  d e s i r a b l e  a s  t h e  F i s h e r ' s  5 t r ana -  
format ion,  whlch y i e l d a  s t h e o r e t i c a l l y  normal d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  and squa r ing  
is obv tous ly  inappropriate when both p o s i t i v e  and nega t tve  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  
found, a  problem which e x i s t s  f o r  ou r  d a t a  bu t  is t r i v i a l  i n  Rossi  s & ' s .  
For comparat ive  y u r p s e s ,  we peformed an  a n a l y s i s  l i k e  t h a t  of Table  5 u s i n g  
squared c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s .  The p a t t e r n  of s i g n s  is t h e  same and a l l  
of t he  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o r r e l a t i o n s  of Table  5 remain so .  I n  
a d d i t i o n .  In  t he  v i g n e t t e  po r t Jon  of t h e  t a b l e ,  t h r e e  a d d i t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o r r e l a t i o n s  v e r e  observed. r ace  wl th  rpp ( r  - -.12) and educa t lon  v i t h  
rsS ( r  - .16) and r p p  ( r  - .12) .  Th i s  a n a l y s i s  o f f e r s  mixed r e p l i c a t i v e  
support  f n r  t he  Roani %a. f i n d i n g  of n  s u b s t a n t i a l  educa t lon  e f f e c t  on 
t h e  squared c o r r e l a t i o n  of Jnd iv idua l  and aggrega te  s e r i o u s n e s s ,  w i th  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  found on ly  f o r  t he  v i g n e t t e  d a t a  and not  f o r  t h e  a h s t r n c t  
l a b e l  r a t i n g s  which more c l o s e l y  resemble the  Rossi  &. s t i m u l i .  The 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  more a p p r o p r i a t e  F i s h e r ' s  ?- t r an fo rma t ion  y i e l d s  no suppor t .  
One can o n l y  s p e c u l a t e  why ou r  seemingly more complex measurement s t r a t e g y  
f a i l e d  t o  r evea l  cdu ra t ion - l inked  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  Rossi  e t  aJ. observed.  
16. Although a lpha  w u l d  appear  t o  be a  s t a b l e  i n d i c a t o r  of p u n i t i v e  tendencies .  
n e i t h e r  a lpha nor ou r  measure o f  ave rage  punishment ass igned showed s t a b l e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t o  any demographic v a r i a b l e  o t h e r  than r ace .  Race ahowed a  
c o n s i s t e n t  (a l though no t  a lways s i g n i f i c a n t )  p a t t e r n  f o r  b l acks  t o  a s s i g n  . 
l e s s  punishment. Thus ve conclude t h a t  t h e  ch ie f  demographic d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  t h i s  d a t a  s e t  a r e  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  f i t t i n g  punishment t o  cr ime o r  sg ree -  
i ng  wi th  t h e  group average8 r a t h e r  than pun i t i veness  per  s e .  
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Table  1 
Crime and punishment s t i m u l i '  f o r  psychophysical  s c a l i n g  tasks .a  
Crime list: Crime ~ i a t :  Punishment 
Abs t rac t  Crimes V i ~ n e t t e  Crimes L i s t  
Taking $ 5 0  Taking $50 2 y r s .  i n  p r i s o n  
S t e a l i n g  and abandoning a n  au to  Assaul t  wi thout  weapon 3 y r s .  i n  p r i s o n  
~ s s a u l t  v i t h o u t  a weapon Assaul t  wi th  weapon 5 y r s .  i n  p r i s o n  
Mugging - 
P o l i t i c i a n  accep t ing  b r i b e s  
Assau l t  w i th  a weapon 
Spying f o r  a fo re ign  government 
Manslaughter 
Armed robbery 
Hi j ack ing  a p l ane  
F o r c i b l e  r ape  
Impuls ive k i l l i n g  
Kidnapping 
Mugging 7 y r s .  i n  p r i son  - 
Arned robbery 15 y r s .  i n  p r i s o n  
Forc ib le  r ape  (1) LO y r s .  i n  p r i s o n  
Manslaughter 25 y r s .  i n  p r i s o n  
Forc ib le  r ape  ( 2 )  L i f e .  pa ro le  a f t e r  25 y r s .  
Impulsive k i l l i n g  L i f e ,  no pa ro le  
Kidnapping Death pena l ty  
Armed robbery lu tyde r  
Planned k i l l i n g  (1)  
Planned k i l l i n g  .(2) 
S a l e  of  h e r o i n  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a dea th  Rapelmurder 
Armed robbery i n  which v i c t i m  is 
k i l l e d  
Planned k i l l i n g  
Forc ib le  r ape  i n  which v i c t i m  is 
, k i l l e d  
' ~ a c h  list is arranged i n  o r d e r  of average se r iousness  on  s e v e r i t y  a s  determined by t h i s  sample. -411 lists 
were p resen ted  t o  respondents  i n  random o r d e r .  
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Table  5 
' Table  5 (Continued) 
Zero-order miss ing d a t a  c o r r e l a t i o n 8  of r e l e v a n t  demographic 
variables with  measures of f i t t i n g  t h e  punisliment t o  t h e  
cr ime and oE agreement w i th  t h e  avera8e.a  a A l l  w i th in - ind iv idua l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  were normalized by F i s h e r ' s  - t r a n s f o r m  
be fo re  being c o r r e l a t e d  wi th  t h e  demographics. Nons ign i f i can t  c o r r e l a t i o n s  
a r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  sma l l e r  p r i n t  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  p r e s e n t a t i o n .  N ' s  f o r  each 
miss ing d a t a  c o r r e l a t i o n  a r e  preaented below i t  i n  parentheses .  Where rsp - c o r r e l a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l ' s  crirne s e r i o u s n e s s  w i th  s e v e r i t y  
. ,  - . rs; - c o r r e l a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l ' s  cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  w i th  group , 
average s e r i o u s n e s s  
rpP - c o r r e l a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l ' s  punishment s e v e r i t y  w i th  group 
average s e v e r i t y .  
. ~ - ' " b ~ a c e  and.sGx riie 'Eodid a s  d u ~ y ' v a r i a b l . e s ' ,  Gi th .bl ick . 'b  1 and female -1: ' 
Education is  coded i n  s i x  c a t e g o r i e s  from low t o  h igh  and income i n  15 
c a t e g o r i e s  from low t o  high.  
p a r t i a l  r  - i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p a r t i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  e s t ima ted  from p a t h  model 
l ( b ) .  F igu re  1 
I .  ) 
a lpha  -, i n t e r c e p t  bf '  i n d i v i d u a l l s  r e g r e s s i o n  l i n e  
. . mcanpun - average punishment s e v e r i t y ,  a s s igned  by indiv ' idual  
. . 
Abat rac t  Crimes 
Demographics 
b  
Race Income Educe t i o n  Sex 
r 
aP 
r s ~  
R 
PP 
p a r t i a l  r  
a l p h a  
Vigne t t e  Crimes 
r 
SP 
p a r t i a l  r 
a l p h a  
meanpun 
Table  3 
" Rela t ion  between cr ime s e r i o u s n e s s  and punishment 
s e v e r i t y  a c r o s s  respondents ,  aggregated and 
dieaggregated 
S = group average s e r i o u s n e s s  f o r  each cr ime 
P - group average punishment f o r  each cr ime 
s - i nd iv idua l  respondent ' s  s e r iousness  f o r  each cr ime 
p = i nd iv idua l  respondent ' s  punishment f o r  each cr ime . 
D = d u m i e s  f o r  which cr ime s t imu lus  is being r a t e d  
. . 
Abs t rac t  V igne t t e  
Crimes Crimes 
1. Regression of p on s: R - .56 R - .66 
c o e f f i c i e n t  - .73 c o e f f i c i e n t  - .94 
2. Regress ion o f  p on  s 
p lus  D: R - .65 R - .70 
R~ - .43 R~ - .49 
p a r t i a l  = f o r  s = .27 p a r t i a l  r f o r  s .38 
c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  s - .37 c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  s - .61 
3. Regression of p on s 
p l u s  S: R - .64 
. p a r t i a l  f f o r  s = .26 p a r t i a l  f o r  s - .39 
. ' -  c o e f f i c i e n t  f q r  s - .37 . -  c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  s - .62 
Tab le  4 
Sunsnary o f  i n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  
d e v i a t i o n s  from aggrega te  measures 
( p a r t i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  c r ime . se r iousness  wit!! 
punishment s e v e r i t y  c o n t r o l l i n g  f o r  
sample ave rage  s e r i o u s n e s s  and s e v e r i t y ) .  
Abs t r ac t  cr imesa ~ i ~ n e t t e  crimesa 
Mean 
Median . . 
Mlnimum 
Maximum 
Standard Deviat ion 
X G r e a t e r  t han  Zero 
N f o r  a l l  ana lyses  = 4.595 responses  f o r  a b s t r a c t  cr imes;  3.742 r e sponses  
f o r  v i g n e t t e  crimes. 
Table 6 
Deviation from t h e  model of  " f i t t i n g  t h e  punishment , ' 
t o  t h e  crime" by race  and by i n c ~ m e . ~  
A. Race White Black 
"Badl ' f i t  . 17% 33% 18% 
4 5 9 54 
"Good" f i t  83% , 67% 82% 
225 18  24 3 
100% 100% 100% 
N - 297 
B. Family Income 'Law Middle High 
(0-$7,999) ($8,000- ($20.000 . .... - 
$19,999) up) 
"and" f i t  31% . 18% . 11% ' 19% 
22 18 12 52 
"Good" E l t  69% 82% 89% 81% 
4 9 8 0  98 227 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
N = 279 
'8nd" f i t  - c o r r e l a t i o n  between ra ted  crime se r iousness  and assigned punish- 
ment s e v e r i t y  < .5  f o r  e i t h e r  a b s t r a c t  o r  v igne t te  s t i m u l i .  "Good" f i t  - 
both c o r r e l a t i o n s  2 .5. 
Figure 1 
Models of the  determinat ion of an ind iv idua l ' s  
ser iousnese-severi ty  c o r r e l a t i o n s  by sample 
average r a t i n g s .  
where S - the sample average ser iousness  r a t i n g s  
'P the sample average s e v e r i t y  r a t i n g s  
s - . the ind iv idua l ' s  ser iousness  r a t i n g s  
P ' the  ind tv idus l ' s  s e v e r i t y  r a t i n g s  
u,v a r e  the dev ia t ions  

